Carter v. State, 2012 UT 69

Douglas Carter was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in 1985, with subsequent affirmations and a remand for new sentencing due to an erroneous aggravating-circumstances instruction.
Carter pursued habeas and postconviction proceedings in Utah, with a 1997 statute eventually providing state-funded counsel for indigent defendants in death-penalty postconviction actions.
Counsel were appointed in 1997, and an amended petition was filed in 1998; the district court dismissed most claims as procedurally barred and rejected others on the merits; the Utah Supreme Court affirmed in 2001.
Carter filed a federal habeas petition in 2004; after determining unexhausted claims, he withdrew those claims in 2006 and filed a successive postconviction petition in Utah to address those exhausted/not exhausted issues.
In 2009 the district court dismissed Carter’s successive petition, holding all claims barred except for the claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel; the court found the 2008 PCRA amendments did not have retroactive effect for this claim and that no timely excusal existed.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all claims were procedurally barred except the ineffective-assistance claim, which Carter could not prove would change the outcome; the amendments eliminating Hurst-based exceptions were not retroactively applied for Carter's petition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the district court abuse its discretion denying a six-month stay?	Carter argues the stay was warranted due to prior counsel deficiencies and judicial economy.	State contends no sufficient showing of possible progress or benefits from a six-month stay.	No abuse; stay denial affirmed.
Are all claims procedurally barred except IAC of postconviction counsel?	Carter asserts some barred claims fall under exceptions or could be addressed for good cause.	State maintains most claims are barred as previously raised or could have been raised earlier; no exceptions apply.	All claims barred except ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.
Do Hurst common-law exceptions apply to Carter’s petition filed before 2008 amendment?	Carter seeks relief under pre-amendment good-cause exceptions.	State argues amendments removed these exceptions, precluding relief.	Hurst exceptions do not apply; no relief from procedural bar.
Has Carter shown ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel to overcome the bar?	Carter claims counsel deficient in investigation and presentation of mitigation, etc.	State contends no showing of deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland; amendments affect retroactivity but not shown entitlement.	Carter did not prove ineffective assistance; petition affirmed in part and dismissed.

Gardner v. Galetka (Gardner IV), 151 P.3d 968 (Utah 2007) (threshold showing for good-cause exceptions under Hurst framework)
Gardner v. Galetka (Gardner III), 94 P.3d 263 (Utah 2004) (facial plausibility threshold for considering Hurst exceptions)
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) (five good-cause exceptions to procedural bar; threshold showing required)
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003) (tactical reasons presumption when counsel focuses on issues)
Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232 (Utah 2011) (limits on constructive denial of counsel; role in PCRA framework)
Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006) (right to effective postconviction counsel pre-amendment; constructive denial)
State v. Jimenez, 284 P.3d 640 (Utah 2012) (ineffective assistance standard; Strickland test)
Taylor v. State, 270 P.3d 471 (Utah 2012) (PCRA amendments and retroactivity context)
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (U.S. 2005) (dilatoriness concerns in capital postconviction petitions)
Kell v. State, 285 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2012) (PCRA amendments and retroactivity considerations)