Carter v. State, 439 P.3d 616

Background

In 1985 Douglas Stewart Carter was convicted of murdering Eva Olesen; key testimony came from witnesses Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, who corroborated Carter’s confession but later vanished before resentencing.
No physical evidence tied Carter to the crime scene; Carter signed a confession obtained after interrogation in Nashville and after further questioning by Utah officers.
At resentencing in 1992 the Tovars were absent and their earlier trial testimony was read to the jury; the jury again imposed death.
In 2011 Carter’s counsel located the Tovars, who executed sworn declarations alleging police and prosecutorial misconduct: undisclosed financial benefits (rent, utilities, groceries), threats (deportation, removal of their child, imprisonment), and coaching or instructions to lie about the benefits at trial.
Carter filed a PCRA petition asserting Brady, Napue, and improper vouching claims; the district court granted summary judgment for the State, finding disputed facts on favorability/suppression but concluding no material prejudice as a matter of law and treating the vouching claim as time-barred.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed summary judgment on Brady and Napue (finding genuine disputes of material fact as to prejudice for both guilt and sentencing phases), affirmed dismissal of the vouching claim as procedurally barred, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing; several evidentiary rulings excluding proffered declarations were upheld.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Carter)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Brady: nondisclosure of impeachment (financial benefits, coaching, threats)	Suppressed evidence that police paid/assisted Tovars, coached them, and threatened them was favorable impeachment and collectively material to guilt and sentencing	Many impeaching avenues were already available; inconsistencies are minimal or explainable by fear; payments could be for witness protection and thus not impeaching; evidence not material	Reversed summary judgment; genuine disputes of material fact exist on materiality; remand for evidentiary hearing
Napue: prosecutor failed to correct false testimony about benefits	Watson knew or should have known Tovars received more than a $14 fee and failed to correct Mr. Tovar’s false testimony, which could reasonably affect the jury	Any nondisclosure lacked material effect; impeachment may have hurt more than helped; trial counsel already could have exposed threats/fear	Reversed summary judgment; genuine dispute of material fact exists whether correction would likely have produced a more favorable outcome; remand for hearing
Procedural bar to improper vouching claim	Vouching claim is tied to newly discovered evidence so limitations should be tolled	Vouching is based on prosecutor’s courtroom statements known at trial; limitations accrued then	Affirmed: claim is time-barred because the factual basis (prosecutor’s statements) was known in 1985
Evidentiary rulings excluding declarations and expert statements	Proffered declarations and expert reports were relevant to show coercion, materiality, and why claims were not raised earlier	Many proffers lacked personal knowledge, were legal conclusions, irrelevant to Brady/Napue, or inadmissible character/hearsay evidence	Affirmed district court’s exclusions in part: several declarations and expert materials properly excluded; some portions allowed only where grounded in personal knowledge

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutorial suppression of favorable evidence violates due process)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady materiality defined as a reasonable probability of a different result)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor must learn of and disclose favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf; consider suppressed evidence collectively)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady elements articulated: favorable, suppressed, prejudice)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (state must correct known false testimony; uncorrected falsehoods require new trial if they could have affected jury judgment)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Napue extended to situations where false testimony is allowed to stand uncorrected; materiality standard explained)
Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123 (Utah 2005) (suppressed impeachment transcripts undermined reliability of key witness and warranted vacatur of death sentence)
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989) (prior appeal affirming denial of suppression of confession)
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) (describing the Tovars as the State’s key witnesses in resentencing)