Carter v. State, 58, 2017

On June 22, 2013 Arthur Carter fired a gun into the air after an argument at the home of his pregnant girlfriend, Morlicea Capers; 911 calls and Carter’s own admission corroborated the event.
At trial Carter and the State stipulated that Carter was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm; the stipulation did not state why he was prohibited and the jury received limiting instructions not to consider it as evidence of guilt for other charges.
Officer Tate testified about interviewing Ms. Capers (identification, altercation, flight and return with a gun); two 911 calls (including one from a child) were played for the jury.
Carter was convicted of aggravated menacing, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; he was sentenced as an habitual offender to 30 years Level V.
Post-conviction, Carter argued ineffective assistance for (a) failing to sever the person-prohibited charge, (b) not calling Ms. Capers (who later swore she would have denied feeling threatened), and (c) failing to object to the officer’s recounting of Capers’ statements as hearsay.
The Superior Court denied relief finding no prejudice: the stipulation was limited and not emphasized, counsel reasonably declined to call Capers to avoid impeachment, and the officer’s testimony was cumulative of 911 recordings. This Court affirmed.

Issue	Carter's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for stipulating to Carter being a person prohibited (failure to sever)	Stipulation allowed jury to infer bad character and prejudiced other charges	Stipulation omitted reason for prohibition; jury instructed to disregard it; State did not emphasize it	No ineffective assistance; no prejudice from stipulation
Whether counsel was ineffective for not calling Ms. Capers as a defense witness	Capers would have testified she never felt threatened and no gun was pointed at her	Counsel reasonably pursued strategy to avoid damaging cross-examination and impeachment from prior inconsistent statements	No ineffective assistance; strategic decision plausible and not prejudicial
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to officer’s testimony recounting Capers’ statements as hearsay	Officer’s recounting was inadmissible hearsay and prejudicial	The officer’s testimony was cumulative of the 911 excited utterances and other evidence	No ineffective assistance; testimony was cumulative and not prejudicial
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing denial of motion for acquittal	(raised below) Insufficiently raised at appellate level	Evidence (circumstantial and direct) sufficed for a rational trier of fact	No ineffective assistance on appeal; conviction supported by record

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768 (Del. 2016) (reinforces Strickland standard in Delaware practice)
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186 (Del. 1996) (standard of review for post-conviction relief: abuse of discretion)
Johnson v. State, 587 A.2d 444 (Del. 1991) (inadmissible or improper testimony may be harmless where cumulative)
Massey v. State, 953 A.2d 210 (Del. 2008) (discussion of severance and prejudice from evidence of other bad acts)