Carter v. State
298 Ga. 867
Ga.2016Background
- Chernard Carter and co-defendants exchanged gunfire at an apartment complex; a stray bullet killed Lynette Reese.
- Carter was charged with malice murder and three counts of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault; jury instructions included provocation/voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of both malice and felony murder.
- Jury acquitted Carter of malice murder and acquitted of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of malice murder, but convicted him of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of each felony-murder count.
- Carter appealed, arguing the verdicts were "repugnant" because he was both guilty and not guilty of voluntary manslaughter regarding the same victim.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, reviewed whether voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of malice murder is the same offense as voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of felony murder, and whether the verdicts were repugnant.
Issues
| Issue | Carter's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury's guilty and not-guilty findings on voluntary manslaughter were a repugnant verdict (same offense acquitted and convicted) | Verdicts are impermissibly repugnant because they find Carter both guilty and not guilty of voluntary manslaughter as to Reese | The two voluntary manslaughter findings arise from different underlying offenses (malice vs. felony murder) and can be reconciled; no repugnancy | No repugnant verdict; affirm conviction |
| Whether voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of malice murder is the same crime as voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of felony murder | They are the same statutory offense (voluntary manslaughter) so inconsistent findings are impermissible | They are legally distinct when tied to different predicates because malice murder requires intent to kill while felony murder does not | Distinct: voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of malice murder requires intent to kill; as a lesser of felony murder it does not; thus not the same offense |
| Whether the Court of Appeals’ suggested jury rationale (provocation mitigating felony murder but not malice murder) is legally plausible | Jury could have found provocation excused intent re: co-defendants and victim did not provoke malice murder theory | Jury cannot rely on provocation to mitigate malice murder if no intent to kill exists; that rationale is flawed as applied to malice murder | Court disapproved the Court of Appeals’ explanation to the extent it implies provocation can mitigate malice murder where no intent to kill existed |
| Whether prior authority (Walker v. State) requiring intent to kill for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of felony murder remains valid | Walker suggested intent was required for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of felony murder | Walker to the extent it required intent to kill for that lesser is incorrect | Overruled Walker to the extent it imposed an intent-to-kill requirement for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of felony murder |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiley v. State, 124 Ga. App. 654 (1971) (Court of Appeals decision discussing "repugnant" verdicts)
- Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560 (1986) (abolition of the inconsistent-verdict rule)
- Turner v. State, 283 Ga. 17 (2008) (discussing limits on attacking inconsistent jury verdicts and Powell rationale)
- Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797 (1996) (defendant cannot attack as inconsistent guilty and not-guilty verdicts on different counts)
- United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (federal rule barring inquiry into jury deliberations to explain inconsistent verdicts)
- Knight v. State, 271 Ga. 557 (1999) (malice irrelevant to felony murder)
- Wallace v. State, 294 Ga. 257 (2013) (discussing elements of felony murder)
- Walker v. State, 258 Ga. 443 (1988) (addressed voluntary manslaughter as a lesser of felony murder; court narrows/overrules its holding here)
- Smashum v. State, 261 Ga. 248 (1991) (applying Powell principles in Georgia criminal context)
- Springer v. State, 297 Ga. 376 (2015) (distinguishing mutually exclusive convictions from inconsistent/repugnant verdict contexts)