Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Company, 976 N.E.2d 344

Plaintiff Sue Carter, as special administrator of Joyce Gott, filed suit against SSC Odin Operating Co. in Marion County, alleging a Nursing Home Care Act violation (survival action) and a wrongful-death claim.
Gott was a resident during 2005–2006; she died January 31, 2006.
Two arbitration agreements were signed in 2005 (by Gott’s legal representative) and 2006 (by Gott herself) containing a $200,000 arbitration floor and FAA governance.
The agreements required the arbitrators' fees to be paid by defendant, awarded Gott attorney-fee benefits, and allowed Gott to choose arbitration location; the agreements purported to bind Gott and related parties.
The trial court denied arbitration; the appellate court affirmed, while the Supreme Court granted leave to review to address enforceability and arbitratability, remanding for other issues.
The Supreme Court ultimately held the arbitration agreements are enforceable against Gott’s survival claim, but the wrongful-death claim cannot be compelled against Carter as a nonparty to the arbitration agreements; Marmet was distinguished and the matter remanded for proceedings on remaining issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mutuality of obligation for arbitration	Gott’s illusory promise due to $200k floor negates mutuality	Other consideration could support Gott’s promise to arbitrate	Arbitrations enforceable; mutuality defense not available
Arbitrability of wrongful-death claim against nonparty	Plaintiff, as Gott’s representative, should arbitrate all claims	Wrongful-death action is derivative and bound if decedent’s action would be	Wrongful-death claim cannot be compelled against Carter as nonparty to the agreement
Derivative nature of wrongful-death action and contract defenses	Derivative nature doesn't allow broad arbitration against nonparties	Derivative status supports arbitration under decedent’s agreements	Contract principles apply; nonparties cannot be compelled to arbitrate the wrongful-death claim

Waffle House, Inc. v. EEOC, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (arbitration is a matter of consent; cannot bind nonparties; FAA preempts overbroad state rules)
Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 358 Ill. App. 3d 20 (2005) (mutuality as proxy for consideration in arbitration)
Mooney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 414 (1909) (derivative nature of wrongful-death action; limitations depend on decedent’s pre-death rights)
Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40 (Utah 2008) (derivative theory not controlling for nonparties to arbitration)
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102 (1921) (mutuality related to consideration; not require equal exchange)
Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill.2d 449 (1995) (derivative nature; limits on wrongful-death actions)
McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 176 Ill.2d 482 (1997) (consideration sufficiency; mutuality not strictly required)
In re Estate of Savio, 388 Ill. App. 3d 242 (2009) (wrongful-death action as estate asset for procedural purposes; not substantive control over forum)
City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 (1857) (historical view that wrongful-death proceeds are not assets of the decedent’s estate)
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (FAA supremacy; not categorical antiarbitration rule; remand to consider state-law defenses)