Carter v. National Railroad Passenger
63 F. Supp. 3d 1118
N.D. Cal.2014Background
- Gary Carter was killed by an Amtrak train while walking with his dogs along a path near a rail right-of-way in Newark, California, December 3, 2011.
- Plaintiffs (wife and minor child) bring wrongful death and survivor claims against Amtrak and Union Pacific based on negligence and premises liability theories.
- The incident occurred in a remote, industrial area with no gate or warning signs at the trailhead; Carter allegedly crossed from the parking lot to a dirt path parallel to the tracks.
- Disputed facts include timing and sequencing of train horn blasts and whether the crew applied emergency braking prior to impact; there is video and event recorder data but no consensus.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of ownership/control, lack of duty, and FRSA preemption of many claims; plaintiffs opposed on duty and non-preempted theories.
- The court granted in part and denied in part: Amtrak premises claims dismissed; UP premises claims limited to a potential duty to fence but not to warn; training-related and related claims preempted; some non-preempted negligence claims against Amtrak survive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to fence or warn on Union Pacific property | UP had a duty to prevent harm to trespassers due to worn paths and frequent trespassing. | No duty to fence or warn where trespassers are on property; foreseeability is limited and premiums of policy considerations weigh against a duty. | UP duty to fence rejected; premises liability duty not established as a matter of law; foreseeability and Rowland factors do not mandate fencing. |
| FRSA preemption of negligence and training claims against Amtrak/UP | Post-2007 FRSA amendments preserve state-law claims for violations of federal standards or internal railroad rules; not all claims preempted. | Most claims (negligent training, supervision, horn operation, etc.) preempted by FRSA and FRA regulations. | Negligent training/supervision claims preempted; excessive-speed claims preempted; some specific-hazard and horn-sequence claims survive where not fully covered by uniform federal standards. |
| Negligent horn operation not preempted and viability of claims | Crew failed to follow long/long/short/long sequence and emergency horn patterns; regulation violations support negligence. | Emergency horn and sequence requirements are preempted or ambiguously defined; defense argues compliance or no duty. | Negligent horn sequence claim not preempted to the extent it concerns proper sequence near Stevenson Crossing; emergency-horn argument preempted. |
| Negligent lookout and response to a specific hazard | Crew could have slowed or braked given a specific hazard; failure to respond constitutes negligence. | Lookout claim not proven; any potential slowing would be precluded by evidentiary/harm considerations; the hazard was not imminent. | Negligent lookout claim dismissed; negligent slowdown claim a question for trial but requires factual dispute; not precluded from trial on slow/stop theory. |
| Premises liability against Amtrak | Amtrak, as operator near right-of-way, bears premises liability duties to warn or fence against foreseeable trespass hazards. | Amtrak does not own/controls the land; premises-liability claims against Amtrak are untenable. | Premises liability claims against Amtrak dismissed with prejudice; UP premises claims survive to the extent of limited duties to fence or warn, not to warn generally. |
Key Cases Cited
- Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court 1993) (preemption framework for FRSA; 'covering' standard)
- Silva v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 85 Cal.App.4th 1024 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (railroads' duty to fence; Rowland factors guidance)
- Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108 (Cal. 1968) (establishes duty framework balancing foreseeability, policy, and social factors)
- Beausoleil v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.Supp.2d 119 (D. Mass. 2001) (specific, individual hazard exception to preemption)
- Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 566 So.2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (illustrates limits of duty to warn where risk is obvious)
- Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal.App.2d 599 (Cal. App. 1949) (duty to look out and respond to hazards near tracks)
- Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488 (Cal. 1942) (statutory basis for negligence not enabling automatic liability)