Carroll v. Hobbs
2014 Ark. 395
| Ark. | 2014Background
- Petitioner Conray Carroll was convicted in 1997 for rape as a habitual offender, receiving a 720-month sentence.
- In 2013 Carroll filed a pro se petition in Jefferson County Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus against the Arkansas Department of Correction Director.
- Circuit Court dismissed the petition, and Carroll appealed.
- Carroll challenged the application of §16-93-611 to his sentence as an unconstitutional sentence enhancement.
- Court held parole eligibility determinations are within the ADC's purview, not trial court authority, and §16-93-611 applies notwithstanding other laws.
- Court affirmed dismissal, holding no right to declaratory relief or mandamus exists under his theory and that parole eligibility is properly governed by the ADC
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §16-93-611 is an unlawful sentence enhancement as applied | Carroll argues §16-93-611 illegally enhances his sentence | ADC correctly applied §16-93-611 to determine parole eligibility | Affirmed; §16-93-611 does not violate rights and is applicable |
| Whether a trial court order was required before applying parole statutes | Carroll contends trial court mustorder parole-status actions | Parole eligibility is ADC prerogative, not court | Affirmed; trial court lacks authority over parole eligibility |
| Whether declaratory judgment/writ mandamus could be granted given the petition's framing | There is a justiciable dispute about parole-eligibility | No basis for declaratory relief or mandamus exists | Affirmed; petition failed to state a basis for relief |
| Whether §16-93-611 violates due process or equal protection | Due process or equal protection violation by applying statute | No constitutional right to parole; statute not violative | Affirmed; no due-process or equal-protection violation shown |
| Whether multiple statutes governing parole eligibility can apply simultaneously | Argues only one applicable parole statute should govern | Both statutes applicable; they harmonize to require seventy percent and fifty-five age rule | Affirmed; provisions read in harmony; appellant not entitled to relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Boles v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 410 (2000) (parole eligibility determined by the law in effect at time of offense)
- Gardner v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 439 (2013) (read statutes harmoniously; pari materia doctrine)
- Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764 (1995) (amendments may indicate legislative intent; clarification of seventy percent rule)
- Pitts v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 457 (2013) (parole eligibility falls within ADC discretion, not trial court)
- Stephens v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 332 (2012) (parole eligibility within ADC authority; notice to jury not required)
- Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. 212 (2012) (parole eligibility within executive branch; ADC prerogative)
- Thompson v. State, 2009 Ark. 235 (2009) (trial court cannot place parole-eligibility conditions on sentence)
- Cridge v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 153 (2014) (writs do not lie to control discretionary matters)
- Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301 (1987) (parole considerations and due process)
- Abdullah v. Lockhart, 302 Ark. 506 (1990) (parole eligibility within ADC authority)
- Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35 (1985) (parole statutes and procedural posture)