389 P.3d 1087
N.M. Ct. App.2016Background
- Arnoldo Carrillo, a licensed trainer/owner with the New Mexico Racing Commission, had four horses injured or die in races between Sept. 2012 and Apr. 2013. After those incidents, four New Mexico racetracks (Zia Park, Sunland Park, SunRay Park, Ruidoso Downs) excluded him from their premises and races.
- Carrillo sued the racetracks (and others) claiming unlawful exclusion and seeking injunctive/declaratory relief and tort claims; the racetracks moved for summary judgment.
- The racetracks relied on the common-law right of a private property owner (and a Commission regulation reaffirming it) to exclude any person for any lawful reason; they submitted undisputed evidence explaining safety, reputational, and business- integrity reasons for exclusion.
- Carrillo argued the statutory provision enacted after his exclusions (Section 60-1A-28.1) or Commission regulations required greater process or limited the racetracks’ power to exclude licensed participants, and he argued a de facto monopoly of tracks could limit exclusionary power.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding racetracks possess a common-law right to exclude licensees and patrons alike, unless a monopolistic setting and arbitrary exclusion are shown. The court remanded claims against stewards and the Commission.
Issues
| Issue | Carrillo's Argument | Racetracks' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of post hoc statute (Section 60-1A-28.1) | Section 60-1A-28.1 governs current/ongoing exclusions and limits racetracks’ rights | Statute enacted after exclusions and after complaint; cannot be applied retroactively | Section 60-1A-28.1 does not apply (retroactivity barred); decision governed by law at time of exclusions |
| Common-law right to exclude licensees | Licensees (trainers/owners) are entitled to narrower exclusion rules and process because licensing implicates livelihood/due process | Private racetracks retain common-law right to exclude any person for any lawful reason; Commission regulation reaffirms that right | Privately owned racetracks have a common-law right to exclude patrons and licensees alike; regulation (15.2.2.8(V)) affirms, not alters, that right |
| Effect of regulatory scheme on common law | Heavy regulation by Commission narrows tracks’ exclusion power and requires procedural protections | Regulations reiterate the common-law exclusion right and do not abrogate it | Commission regulation mirrors common law and does not limit exclusion absent clear statutory language to alter common law |
| Monopoly / arbitrary-exclusion limitation | New Mexico’s staggered, Commission-approved dates create a de facto monopoly; in that context exclusions must not be arbitrary and require due process | Plaintiff failed to prove monopoly or arbitrariness; tracks articulated legitimate business reasons | If a track holds monopoly/quasi-monopoly, exclusion may be subject to greater scrutiny; here Carrillo offered no evidence of monopoly or that exclusions were arbitrary, so summary judgment for racetracks was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913) (recognizes private racetrack owner’s common-law right to exclude)
- Jacobson v. New York Racing Ass’n, 305 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1973) (virtual monopoly of tracks limits arbitrary exclusion of licensees)
- Cox v. National Jockey Club, 323 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (quasi-monopoly status imposes obligation not to arbitrarily exclude licensed jockeys; reasonable justification required)
- Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 1983) (recognizes racetrack’s common-law right to exclude licensed participants when exercised as reasonable business judgment)
- PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. Reynolds, 727 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 2011) (example of legislature/statute limiting common-law exclusion right for licensees)