Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica
755 F.3d 711
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Carrero worked for PREPA since 1986 as an administrative coordinator and participated as a witness in an internal corruption investigation starting in 2007. After she cooperated, her supervisor Ruiz and others allegedly retaliated against her through investigations, discipline, denial of benefits, and ultimately termination.
- Carrero took FMLA leave (for her mother) in 2007 and 2008; PREPA approved a September 2, 2010 request for additional family leave which she attempted to "activate" after her mother’s October 21, 2010 fall.
- PREPA initiated administrative charges against Carrero (January 2008 and August 2008); hearing officers recommended discharge, and executive director Cordero ordered further proceedings and ultimately a termination effective October 31, 2010.
- Carrero alleges defendants interfered with and retaliated against her in violation of the FMLA when they refused to acknowledge/activate her approved leave and fired her during the protected period; she also asserted Puerto Rico whistleblower claims (not challenged on appeal).
- The district court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the FMLA claims with prejudice, and Carrero’s Rule 59(e) motion (which included a request for leave to amend) was denied. She appealed only the FMLA dismissal and denial of leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether complaint plausibly alleged FMLA retaliation for taking/attempting to take leave | Carrero: temporal overlap and pattern of adverse acts after she sought/used leave establish causal link and retaliation | Defendants: termination and other acts were for independent disciplinary reasons arising from investigations, not because of FMLA leave | Court: Dismissal affirmed — complaint lacked facts beyond timing to plausibly show causal connection; preexisting investigations undercut inference of retaliation |
| Whether complaint plausibly alleged FMLA interference (denial of benefits/protection) | Carrero: PREPA refused to activate approved leave and discharged her while protected, denying FMLA benefits | Defendants: once discharge took effect, entitlement to leave/benefits ceased; termination was for independent reasons | Court: Dismissal affirmed — discharge ended FMLA protections and complaint did not plausibly show unlawful denial while leave should have continued |
| Whether district court could consider defendants’ appended documents at Rule 12(b)(6) stage | Carrero: did not object to authenticity but did not append them to complaint | Defendants: documents referenced in complaint and not contested, so properly considered under narrow exception | Court: panel declined to consider those documents for its analysis but noted district court relied on them; outcome affirmed on complaint-alone basis |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend after denying Rule 59(e) motion | Carrero: sought leave to amend as alternative relief to correct deficiencies | Defendants: dismissal on the merits and motion for rehearing lacked grounds; Rule 15 inapplicable while judgment stands | Court: No abuse — Rule 59(e) relief was properly denied and a post-judgment Rule 15 request cannot be considered while judgment stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250 (1st Cir. 2014) (pleading-stage standard and treating complaint facts as true)
- Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (use of prima facie elements as background for plausibility analysis)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 1998) (FMLA purpose and interference/retaliation framework)
- Colburn v. Parker Hannifin, 429 F.3d 325 (1st Cir. 2005) (distinction between substantive FMLA rights and protections for exercising them)
- Orta-Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Química P.R., Inc., 447 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2006) (elements of prima facie FMLA retaliation claim)
- Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2003) (temporal proximity insufficient alone to prove causation)