Carrera v. Yañez, 491 S.W.3d 90

Adolfo Carrera died after his motorcycle struck the rear of Alice Yáñez’s car, throwing him into traffic where he was run over; appellants (Carrera’s estate and survivors) sued for negligence and negligence per se (wrongful death/survival).
Yáñez moved for summary judgment (traditional and no-evidence) supported by her deposition, a third-party witness Michele Power’s deposition, and the investigating officer’s crash report.
Yáñez testified her car began emitting steam and slowed while she tried to exit lanes; she could not confirm whether it stalled or whether she had lifted her foot from the accelerator before being struck from behind.
Power testified Carrera was looking down at a dark device (possible phone) for 3–5 seconds, that Carrera did not appear to see Yáñez’s slowed/stalled car, and estimated Yáñez’s speed at 0–5 mph at impact.
The crash report listed driver inattention and possible cell-phone use by Carrera as contributing factors and noted Yáñez’s vehicle had "vehicle problems" causing it to slow; the officer did not attribute foreseeability of the stall to Yáñez.
The trial court granted Yáñez’s motion; the court of appeals affirmed, focusing on plaintiffs’ failure to produce evidence raising a genuine issue on proximate-cause (foreseeability) attributable to Yáñez.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs produced more than a scintilla of evidence that Yáñez’s conduct proximately caused the death (foreseeability)	Plaintiffs argued the age/mileage of Yáñez’s 1999 car allowed an inference she knew or should have known it would overheat and stall	Yáñez argued plaintiffs produced no evidence she knew or should have known the car would overheat; her testimony was she serviced the car regularly and it had not overheated before	Held: Plaintiffs failed the no-evidence burden on proximate cause; no reasonable inference that Yáñez knew or should have known of impending stall; summary judgment affirmed
Whether summary judgment on negligence claims necessarily disposed of wrongful death and survival claims though Yáñez did not separately move as to those claims	Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred because Yáñez did not separately move on wrongful death/survival	Yáñez argued those claims rest on the same negligence allegations and her motion sought judgment as to all claims arising from negligence	Held: Court held summary judgment on negligence/negligence-per-se necessarily disposed of wrongful death and survival claims; dismissal proper

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard for reviewing traditional summary judgment)
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003) (no-evidence summary judgment treated as directed verdict; legal-sufficiency standard)
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013) (when motion includes both no-evidence and traditional grounds, evaluate no-evidence grounds first)
Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985) (foreseeability: a stalled vehicle on a busy highway is a danger a driver should anticipate)
Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) (inferences and doubts resolved in favor of nonmovant when reviewing summary judgment)