Carr v. Educational Theatre Assn., 2023 Ohio 1681

Diane M. Carr was Executive Director of Educational Theatre Association (EdTA) until a 2019 separation agreement that released claims against EdTA and its employees.
In Aug. 2019 EdTA received complaints from former ITO students about adult ITO liaisons (2013–2019) and retained outside counsel and an independent investigator; EdTA declined to disclose specifics but said complaints did not allege physical abuse.
In June 2020 EdTA learned of additional information and, upon learning Carr would speak at a virtual student leadership event, EdTA’s board and Executive Director Julie Theobald emailed chapter directors urging postponement, citing prior complaints, allegations of negligence and emotional abuse, and a pending investigation; the email did not name Carr.
Carr sued for breach of the separation agreement and for defamation per se based on the email; defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and attached the full email in reply, leading to conversion to summary judgment by stipulation.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the EdTA defendants on the defamation claim, concluding the email was not defamatory as a matter of law; Carr appealed.
The First District affirmed: the email was not defamatory per se; the court declined to address defamation per quod and assumed (without deciding) that the email could refer to Carr.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the email was defamatory per se	Carr: email implied she endangered students; implication/innuendo makes it per se defamatory	EdTA: email expresses subjective concerns and investigatory status, contains no allegation of past wrongdoing; innocent construction applies	Not defamatory per se; summary judgment affirmed
Whether "defamation by implication" is a standalone per se theory	Carr: implication/insinuation suffices as per se defamation	EdTA: Ohio law treats implication as per quod, not a separate per se doctrine	Court held Ohio does not recognize defamation-by-implication as a separate per se claim; aligns implication with per quod
Procedural conversion of motion for judgment on the pleadings to summary judgment	Carr: challenged conversion procedure	EdTA: parties stipulated to conversion and submitted the email for consideration; later filed a full summary-judgment motion	Conversion was proper by stipulation; trial court’s summary-judgment ruling stands
Whether unnamed plaintiff can be defamed	Carr: need not be named if recipients would understand reference	EdTA: email didn’t identify Carr by name	Court assumed, without deciding, recipients could understand the reference but resolved case on non-defamatory meaning

Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 297 N.E.2d 113 (court may consider attached writings and convert pleadings motion to summary judgment)
A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Contr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (defamation per se standard)
Moore v. P.W. Pub. Co., 3 Ohio St.2d 183, 209 N.E.2d 412 (defamation per se is determined "by the very meaning of the words used")
Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 978 N.E.2d 832 (statements must be read in context; totality governs defamatory meaning)
Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St.3d 453, 97 N.E.3d 458 (statements of opinion, conjecture, or prediction are generally not actionable)
Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (expressions of opinion/theory not actionable)
Sethi v. WFMJ Television, Inc., 134 Ohio App.3d 796, 732 N.E.2d 451 (innocent construction rule)
Sullivan v. Tucci, 69 Ohio App.3d 20, 590 N.E.2d 13 (innocent construction rule prevents per se finding when innocent meaning exists)
Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195, 687 N.E.2d 481 (unnamed persons can be defamed if recipients understand reference)