292 So.3d 577
La. Ct. App.2019Background
- Carr & Associates performed appraisal/estimating work for Roselle Jones after a fire; final work dated February 18, 2014, and an unpaid balance remained (about $55,335, with $5,000 paid).
- Carr sued Jones in Orleans Parish on June 30, 2014; initial service failed, a curator was appointed, and Carr obtained summary judgment in May 2015.
- Jones successfully obtained a judgment of nullity (Aug. 4, 2017) for lack of service; the case was re-served and Jones filed a Declinatory Exception of Improper Venue in CDC.
- On November 3, 2017 the CDC entered a consent judgment granting the Exception of Improper Venue and transferring the case to St. Tammany Parish; the judgment included a handwritten/printed notation by counsel: "BY CONSENT: (AS TO TRANSFER ONLY)."
- In St. Tammany, Jones filed an Exception of Prescription arguing Carr’s original Orleans filing did not interrupt prescription because Orleans was not a proper venue; the St. Tammany court treated the CDC consent judgment as a legal admission that Orleans was improper, granted the exception, and dismissed the claims.
- Intervenor/Lehman appealed. The First Circuit reversed and remanded, holding the St. Tammany court erred by treating the consent judgment as a legal barrier to venue inquiry because the consent expressly limited assent to transfer only.
Issues
| Issue | Carr's Argument | Jones's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a transferee court must independently determine if the original forum was a parish of proper venue when deciding an exception of prescription | The consent language limited consent to transfer; transferee must decide venue for prescription purposes | The consent judgment granted the Exception of Improper Venue and therefore is a legal barrier establishing Orleans was improper, so prescription was not interrupted | Court held the consent phrase "AS TO TRANSFER ONLY" meant the November 3 consent judgment did not constitute a legal barrier; transferee must determine whether Orleans was a proper venue before ruling on prescription (reversed & remanded) |
| Whether a consent judgment that appears to grant improper venue but contains limiting language should be interpreted as admitting improper venue | The limiting language is clear; judgment is a contract and must be read according to its plain terms | The consent judgment should be treated as a bilateral contract that established improper venue | Court held consent judgments are contracts to be interpreted from their words; here the language was unambiguous and limited consent to transfer only. If ambiguous, contract construction rules (construe against drafter) apply, but that did not change the result here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Land v. Vidrine, 62 So.3d 36 (La. 2011) (transferee court deciding peremption/prescription must consider whether the claim was timely filed in a court of proper venue unless a legal barrier precludes such consideration)
- Carriere v. Bodenheimer, 120 So.3d 281 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012) (consent judgment whose language expressly admits the original forum was improper constituted a legal barrier precluding further venue inquiry)
- Phillips v. Patterson Ins. Co., 704 So.2d 246 (La. 1998) (discussed in relation to venue review for prescription purposes)