Carpio v. United States
218 F. Supp. 3d 1182
W.D. Wash.2016Background
- Petitioner Rogelio Carpio pleaded guilty in 2012 to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 70 months after the parties and Probation agreed he had two prior "crimes of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines, producing a Guidelines range of 70–87 months.
- The presentence report and the district court treated Washington second-degree robbery and California "Rape by Drugs" as crimes of violence; the record does not state which clause (elements, enumerated, or residual) the court relied on.
- In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held the ACCA residual clause void for vagueness; Welch made Johnson retroactive on collateral review.
- The Guidelines’ residual clause used identical language to ACCA’s residual clause and was later amended to delete the residual clause.
- Carpio filed a §2255 petition arguing his sentence depended on the Guidelines’ residual clause, which Johnson rendered void, and thus he is entitled to resentencing; the Government contested retroactivity and argued the rule is procedural as applied to the Guidelines.
- The district court concluded Johnson applies to the Guidelines and is retroactive, found Carpio’s Rape-by-Drugs conviction could qualify as a crime of violence only under the residual clause, and granted relief, vacating the sentence and ordering resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Johnson’s void-for-vagueness holding apply to the Guidelines’ residual clause? | Johnson’s reasoning applies equally to the identically worded Guidelines residual clause. | Government initially resisted, but conceded in part; argued distinctions exist. | Court: Yes; the identical language and Ninth Circuit treatment justify application to the Guidelines. |
| Is Johnson retroactive to collateral attacks on Guidelines-based sentences? | Johnson announces a substantive rule that alters the class of persons punishable and thus is retroactive under Teague. | Government: as-applied to the advisory Guidelines, Johnson is procedural and not retroactive. | Court: Johnson is substantive with respect to the Guidelines and is retroactive (Welch/Teague analysis and Ninth Circuit precedent). |
| Did the sentencing court rely on the Guidelines’ residual clause in imposing Carpio’s sentence? | Carpio: his Rape-by-Drugs conviction lacks a force element and cannot qualify under elements or enumerated clauses, so the residual clause must have been used. | Government: Movant must prove by preponderance that the court actually relied on the residual clause; parties’ agreement likely produced the finding. | Court: Carpio met the showing—Rape-by-Drugs could be a crime of violence only via the residual clause—so sentencing relied on an unconstitutional clause and relief is warranted. |
| Is Carpio procedurally defaulted or barred by a collateral-review waiver? | Carpio: Johnson was not reasonably available at sentencing; Government misrepresented the plea waiver at sentencing, rendering waiver unenforceable. | Government: Carpio failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and waiver existed. | Court: Procedural default excused (cause and prejudice shown); collateral-review waiver void due to Government’s in-court representation; relief permitted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause is void-for-vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson announced a new substantive rule made retroactive on collateral review)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
- Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2011) (treats substantive rule effects in ACCA and Guidelines contexts similarly)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (Guidelines are central to sentencing and affect sentence ranges)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinction between substantive and procedural new rules)