Carpenters Industrial Council v. Jewell
139 F. Supp. 3d 7
D.D.C.2015Background
- Plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors, and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment challenging the FWS 2012 critical habitat designation for the northern spotted owl (about 9.3 million acres).
- The suit asserts violations of the Oregon/California and Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant Lands Act, FLPMA, APA, NEPA, and the ESA related to the designation.
- This case is one of three related actions (with Swanson II and AFRC v. Jewell) concerning timber sales and owl habitat; Swanson I had held standing problems and was vacated on standing grounds.
- The court issued an Order to Show Cause; new declarations were submitted but the court declined to consider them due to timing and lack of good cause.
- The court ultimately held plaintiffs lack standing; intervenors and organizational standing also fail; defendants’ summary judgment is granted and the case dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the habitat designation? | Plaintiffs claim ongoing or imminent injuries from reduced timber sales and economic harms. | Standing not established; harms not traceable to the designation or not imminent. | No standing; claims dismissed. |
| Should newly submitted declarations be considered for standing? | New declarations demonstrate standing. | Declarations submitted after briefing are untimely. | Not considered; insufficient cause to reopen record. |
| Do plaintiff-intervenors have standing to challenge the designation? | Intervenors rely on adjoining counties’ interests in disease/insect control and economic effects. | No likelihood of imminent harm tied to designation; standing fails. | Intervenors lack standing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (standing requirements and harm proffer in Swanson I upheld; lack of standing shown)
- Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (standing based on detailed evidence of wildfire risk; foundational for standing in ecological challenges)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing elements and injury in fact)
- Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (standing requires timely and sufficient nexus; cannot rely on post hoc declarations)
- Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (injunction standing requires imminent and substantial injury)
