576 F. App'x 470
6th Cir.2014Background
- Plaintiff Wood tripped on a roughly 1/4-inch lip where Wal‑Mart’s parking-lot asphalt met the sidewalk, injuring her hand.
- Wood sued Wal‑Mart in Tennessee state court for negligence (failure to repair/warn) and negligence per se (alleged violation of building codes); Wal‑Mart removed to federal court.
- The parties offered competing expert witnesses to interpret whether the transition was a “means of egress” under the cited codes: Wal‑Mart’s architect (Edwards) and Wood’s engineer (Johnson).
- The district court admitted both experts but barred them from testifying directly on causation.
- The court refused Wood’s proposed negligence‑per‑se jury instruction; the jury heard ordinary negligence instructions and considered code evidence in that context.
- The jury returned a verdict for Wal‑Mart; Wood appealed, challenging (1) admission of Wal‑Mart’s expert, (2) denial of negligence‑per‑se instruction, and (3) admission of evidence about lack of prior accidents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of defendant’s expert (Daubert) | Edwards’ code interpretation was unreliable and not grounded in accepted methodology | Edwards is a non‑scientific, experienced architect whose personal knowledge is a proper reliability basis | District court did not abuse discretion admitting Edwards; any error in code interpretation testimony was harmless |
| Expert opining on legal issue (code interpretation) | Non‑lawyer Edwards improperly opined on questions of law (building code applicability) | Even if improper, any error was harmless because Wood didn’t show prejudice | If error, it was harmless; no reversible error shown |
| Denial of negligence per se instruction | Codes apply; failure to comply mandates per se instruction | Court reasonably found codes’ applicability disputed and exercised discretion in instructions | Denial reviewed for abuse of discretion; no abuse found given court’s reasoning and record |
| Admission of evidence re: lack of prior accidents | Evidence of no prior accidents is irrelevant and prejudicial to foreseeability inquiry | Frequency (or absence) of prior incidents is relevant to notice/foreseeability under Tennessee law and Federal Rules allow such evidence | District court did not abuse discretion admitting evidence about lack of prior accidents; relevant and not unduly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial judge assesses expert reliability; factors not exclusive)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert principles apply to non‑scientific experts; judge has broad latitude)
- First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass'n v. Barreto, 268 F.3d 319 (6th Cir. 2001) (Daubert factors need not apply in every case; personal experience can show reliability)
- Smith v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 1999) (interpretation of building codes is a question of law for the court)
- Ventas, Inc. v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2011) (denial of requested jury instruction reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Legg v. Chopra, 286 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2002) (in diversity cases, federal rules govern admissibility of evidence)