Carolyn Sue Kelsey v. Nita Lint
322 Mich. App. 364
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- On Aug 31, 2013, Carolyn Kelsey returned to defendant Nita Lint’s residential property (after attending Lint’s garage sale the prior day), exited her vehicle, and was immediately bitten by Lint’s dog.
- Plaintiffs sued under Michigan’s statutory dog-bite statute (MCL 287.351), a common-law negligence dog-bite theory, and a loss-of-consortium claim.
- Lint moved for summary disposition arguing Kelsey was a trespasser when she returned after the sale, eliminating statutory-liability and reducing common-law duties to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct.
- Plaintiffs argued Kelsey had an implied license to approach the front door (not soliciting), pointed to an absence of fences or no-trespassing signage, and produced a recorded statement in which Lint admitted the dog had previously bitten a mailman.
- The trial court granted summary disposition for Lint and denied plaintiffs’ request for sanctions under MCR 2.114(E); the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on liability and vacated the sanctions ruling for further factfinding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kelsey was lawfully on private property under MCL 287.351 | Kelsey had an implied license to approach the house and knock; no fence or no-trespass signs; "no soliciting" sign did not bar entry and Kelsey was bitten before seeing it | End of garage sale terminated invitee status so Kelsey was a trespasser when she returned | Reversed trial court: jury question — implied license exists; reasonable minds could find Kelsey was licensee, not trespasser |
| Applicability of statutory dog-bite liability (MCL 287.351) | If Kelsey was lawfully on property (licensee), statutory strict liability applies | If trespasser, statute does not apply | Remanded — court held Kelsey’s status is factual and statute claim survives summary disposition if jury finds she was licensee |
| Common-law negligence duty arising from dog ownership | Owner had duty to exercise ordinary care to control dog given foreseeable harm and prior aggression | If Kelsey was trespasser, duty limited to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct; keeping a dog with no known vicious history is not willful/wanton | Remanded — because status is factual, trial court erred applying trespasser standard; common-law claim survives summary disposition |
| Whether defense counsel violated MCR 2.114(D) and sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) are mandatory | Defense counsel signed papers denying prior bites despite recorded statement; counsel failed to investigate and correct filings — sanctions required if inquiry was unreasonable | Lint contends she has a poor memory; trial court credited counsel’s character and denied sanctions | Vacated denial of sanctions and remanded for trial-court findings on whether counsel made a reasonable inquiry; if violation found, sanctions are mandatory |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (recognizes implied license to approach a home and knock)
- People v. Frederick, 500 Mich. 228 (2017) (Michigan recognizes implied license to approach front door)
- Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich. 591 (2000) (defines invitee, licensee, trespasser duties)
- Koivisto v. Davis, 277 Mich. App. 492 (2008) (explains near-absolute liability of MCL 287.351)
- Pippin v. Atallah, 245 Mich. App. 136 (2001) (consent to enter may be implied by acquiescence in customary public use)
- Trager v. Thor, 445 Mich. 95 (1994) (common-law negligence standard for animal control)
- Guerrero v. Smith, 280 Mich. App. 647 (2008) (standard for sanctions under MCR 2.114)
- LaRose Mkt, Inc. v. Sylvan Ctr., Inc., 209 Mich. App. 201 (1995) (objective standard for reasonableness of counsel's prefiling inquiry)