Carolyn J. Carlson, Trustee of the Carolyn J. Carlson Living Trust v. Latvian Lutheran Exile Church of Boston and Vicinity Patrons, Inc.
170 N.H. 299
| N.H. | 2017Background
- Carlson holds a non-exclusive deeded easement over a private driveway that runs from Lake Massasecum to Davis Road; Kingsbury owned the fee to the tract containing the driveway and later sold it to the Schweizers during litigation.
- Patrons (defendant) asserted a right to use the same driveway to access the lake and in 2012 physically improved and used the driveway, prompting disputes with Carlson and Kingsbury.
- Carlson and Kingsbury sued in superior court seeking to quiet title to the driveway and a declaratory judgment that Patrons had no right (or had lost any right) to use it; Patrons counterclaimed asserting a deeded easement, prescriptive rights, and equitable servitudes.
- After the Schweizers purchased Kingsbury’s lot and declined to participate, the bench trial resumed; the trial court found Carlson lacked standing to quiet title but had standing and on the merits declared Patrons had no right to use the driveway.
- On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held Carlson lacked standing for both the quiet title claim and the declaratory relief, vacated the declaratory judgment, affirmed dismissal of the quiet title claim, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Carlson have standing to obtain declaratory relief under RSA 491:22 to prevent Patrons’ use of the driveway? | Carlson: statute allows a declaratory action before actual invasion; she is an easement holder threatened by Patrons’ claimed right. | Patrons: Carlson must show interference with her easement rights; no interference occurred so no adverse claim and no standing. | Held: No standing — parties’ rights were not adverse and Patrons’ use did not (and was not shown likely to) interfere; declaratory judgment vacated. |
| Can an owner of a non‑exclusive easement sue to enjoin a trespasser absent interference with easement use? | Carlson: easement status alone gives standing to stop a trespass across the easement. | Patrons: easement holders lack possessory rights and cannot bring trespass/ejectment claims absent interference. | Held: Easement holder lacking exclusivity cannot sue to enjoin use absent actual or likely interference. |
| Was Carlson’s procedural argument — that the Schweizers’ notice and election not to join bind them and therefore preserve her standing — sufficient? | Carlson: Schweizers had notice, declined to join, and took subject to the pending suit, so trial could proceed. | Patrons: those facts do not create adversity or interference necessary for standing. | Held: Procedural posture insufficient; Mansur distinguished and does not confer standing here. |
| Did Carlson have standing to bring a quiet title action against Patrons under RSA 498:5‑a? | Carlson: trial court erred in ruling Schweizers were necessary parties; alternatively they were bound and she had standing. | Patrons: quiet title requires an adverse claimant; Patrons’ claim was not adverse to Carlson’s easement. | Held: No standing to quiet title against Patrons because their claim was not adverse to Carlson’s right; dismissal affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630 (standing and ripeness requirement for declaratory relief)
- Cady v. Town of Deerfield, 169 N.H. 575 (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
- Portsmouth Hosp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 109 N.H. 53 (declaratory relief can be sought before actual invasion)
- Low v. Streeter, 66 N.H. 36 (easement is non‑possessory; easement holder cannot maintain possessory actions absent interference)
- Lake v. Sullivan, 145 N.H. 713 (plaintiff lacked standing for trespass claim without proof of disturbed possessory interest)
- Mansur v. Muskopf, 159 N.H. 216 (distinguished — there interference was properly before trial court)
- Avery v. N.H. Dep’t of Educ., 162 N.H. 604 (declaratory judgment cannot be based on hypothetical facts)
- Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., 537 F.3d 1329 (lack of standing where fear of future harm is speculative)
