Caroline Guzman v. Brown County
884 F.3d 633
7th Cir.
2018

Background

  • Caroline Guzman worked as a Brown County 911 telecommunicator from 2002–2013 and had a prior 2006 diagnosis of sleep apnea treated with a CPAP; she discontinued treatment after 2008 bariatric surgery and had no recent diagnosis or ongoing treatment by 2013.
  • The call center enforces strict attendance rules and a progressive discipline policy; Guzman had multiple warnings over years for tardiness, missed trainings, and vacation misuse.
  • On February 9, 2013 Guzman overslept; after a deputy welfare check she received a three-day suspension (to be served in March). She was again late on March 8, 2013; Director Peltier decided to terminate her employment that day.
  • Guzman sought a doctor’s note from her psychiatrist on March 8; Dr. Stamm wrote that Guzman “most probably” had sleep apnea and should be retested. Guzman provided that note at or after the March 15 termination meeting; dispute exists whether she requested FMLA leave before termination.
  • Guzman filed suit alleging FMLA interference and retaliation, ADA and Rehabilitation Act disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and disability retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for Brown County and this appeal followed.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
FMLA interference — was Guzman entitled to FMLA leave and was it denied? Guzman argued sleep apnea constituted a serious health condition and Brown County interfered with her attempt to obtain FMLA leave. Brown County argued Guzman had no continuing treatment or recent diagnosis in 2013 and gave no timely notice; termination decision preceded any notice. Court: Summary judgment for Brown County — Guzman failed to show a serious health condition or timely/constructive notice, and decision to fire was made before any FMLA notice.
FMLA retaliation — was termination or discipline caused by prior or recent FMLA leave requests? Guzman argued termination and disciplinary pattern resulted from (or was worsened by) her prior FMLA leaves. Brown County argued termination decision was made March 8 before any notice and disciplinaries were justified by performance. Court: Summary judgment for Brown County — no causal link, temporal proximity and comparator evidence insufficient.
Disability discrimination under ADA/Rehabilitation Act — was termination based on disability? Guzman contended sleep apnea was a disability and caused her tardiness, so firing was discriminatory. Brown County emphasized Peltier did not know about sleep apnea and firing was for repeated violations of attendance policy. Court: Summary judgment for Brown County — no evidence Peltier knew of disability; rule violations justified termination even if caused by disability.
Failure to accommodate / disability retaliation — did employer know and refuse accommodation or retaliate? Guzman claimed she requested accommodation (or employer had notice) and was retaliated against (including post-termination sheriff involvement). Brown County argued there was no notice before the misconduct, post-termination events are not adverse employment actions, and no causal connection shown. Court: Summary judgment for Brown County — no timely notice or request before termination; post-termination acts not actionable as employment retaliation.

Key Cases Cited

  • Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (standard for reviewing summary judgment)
  • Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2006) (elements of FMLA interference claim)
  • Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass, GmbH, 359 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2004) (employee’s notice duty for FMLA leave)
  • Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2003) (constructive notice from abnormal behavior)
  • Stevenson v. Hyre Elec. Co., 505 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2007) (examples of stark behavioral changes for constructive notice)
  • Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2009) (employer not liable if same decision would have been made absent protected activity)
  • Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2012) (timing of leave request after termination defeats causal claim)
  • Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2015) (elements of FMLA retaliation)
  • Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2009) (temporal proximity alone insufficient for causation)
  • Hull v. Stoughton Trailers, LLC, 445 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (standard for similarly situated comparators)
  • Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2008) (employer may treat repeated infractions more severely)
  • Budde v. Kane Cnty. Forest Preserve, 597 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2010) (violation of workplace rule caused by disability is not a defense to discipline)
  • Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000) (employer not obligated to accommodate until informed)
  • Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2011) (elements of disability-retaliation claim)
  • Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991) (post-termination acts are not adverse employment actions)
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