Carole Kuligoski, Individually and on behalf of Michael J. Kuligoski, and Mark Kuligoski and James M. Kuligoski v. Evan M. Rapoza, John E. Rapoza, Anne M. Rapoza, John A. Rapoza and Christine M. Rapoza, 183 A.3d 1145

In 2010–11 Evan Rapoza, diagnosed with schizophreniform/schizoaffective disorders, was hospitalized, discharged with antipsychotics, and later admitted he stopped taking medication.
On February 26, 2011, Evan severely assaulted Michael Kuligoski while helping his father renovate an apartment in a building owned by Evan's grandparents; father managed the property for grandparents and sometimes paid family for work.
Plaintiffs sued Evan (assault), Evan's parents (negligent supervision), and grandparents (vicarious liability and negligent failure to keep property safe), later dismissing claims against Evan and his parents by stipulation; appeal concerns only grandparents.
Grandparents moved for summary judgment arguing (1) no foreseeability of the assault because they didn’t know of Evan’s mental illness, (2) father was an independent contractor not an employee, and (3) parents undertook no monitoring duty; trial court granted summary judgment.
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, but on the ground that, as a matter of law, grandparents and father did not have an employer-employee relationship under the common-law "right-to-control" test, so respondeat superior could not impose vicarious liability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Foreseeability of harm	Attack was foreseeable because Evan had violent tendencies known to parents	Grandparents owed no duty because harm was unforeseeable to them	Not reached as dispositive; court disposed on employment issue
Respondeat superior (employment status of father)	Father was grandparents' employee (managed building, paid monthly) so his negligence can be imputed	Father was an independent contractor; grandparents did not control means/methods	No employer-employee relationship as a matter of law under right-to-control test; vicarious liability not imposed
Preclusive effect of earlier judgment for parents	Plaintiffs argued they may still impute parents' negligence to grandparents	Grandparents argued prior summary judgment for parents precludes claim	Rejected — no preclusion because final judgment did not exist until later stipulation
Undertaking/monitoring duty by parents	Parents undertook to monitor Evan after hospitalization, creating liability that could be imputed	No evidence parents undertook monitoring; policy bars imposing such duty	Court found no evidence of an undertaking by grandparents and did not impose liability under that theory

White v. Quechee Lakes Landowners' Ass'n, 742 A.2d 734 (Vt. 1999) (standard of review on summary judgment)
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Watts, 171 A.3d 392 (Vt. 2017) (summary judgment evidentiary standards)
Robertson v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 848 A.2d 310 (Vt. 2004) (inferences for nonmoving party on summary judgment)
Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086 (Vt. 1999) (respondeat superior scope of employment rule)
Iverson v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 801 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 2011) (assault on owner’s property not automatically impose respondeat superior)
Hathaway v. Tucker, 14 A.3d 968 (Vt. 2010) (right-to-control test for employment status)
RLI Ins. Co. v. Agency of Transp., 762 A.2d 475 (Vt. 2000) (use of right-to-control and Restatement factors)
LeClair v. LeClair, 169 A.3d 743 (Vt. 2017) (distinguishing statutory employment tests from common-law control test)
Crawford v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 220 A.2d 480 (Vt. 1966) (factors weighing against employer-employee relationship)