Carole Krechman v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104

Background

Robert Appel, delusional and unarmed, was detained by four police officers after a 911 hang-up; a physical struggle ensued during handcuffing, and officers applied knee restraints while Appel was face-down and later unresponsive.
Paramedics arrived after a delay; CPR was not performed and handcuffs were not removed before transport; Appel was pronounced dead at the hospital.
Plaintiff Carole Krechman (individually and as personal representative) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force theory) and state-law negligence; district court held a six-day jury trial.
Competing expert theories: defense experts attributed death to sudden natural causes (hyperkalemia/kidney failure); plaintiff’s experts and the coroner testified that restraint (compression/asphyxia or stress-induced arrhythmia) contributed to death.
After a jury hung, the district court granted defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding no causation or constitutional violation; plaintiff appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)	Krechman argued the evidence (viewed in plaintiff’s favor) supported that officers’ force was a substantial factor in death and created jury questions on constitutional violation and negligence	Defendants argued medical evidence showed natural causes (renal failure/hyperkalemia) and that officers’ conduct was reasonable	Reversed: court erred by weighing credibility and failing to view evidence and draw inferences in plaintiff’s favor; Rule 50 standard misapplied and case remanded for new trial
Whether defendants’ pre- or post-handcuffing conduct violated the Fourth Amendment or supported negligence as a matter of law	Krechman argued force used (knees, carotid hold, prolonged prone restraint) could constitute excessive force and negligence under jury review	Defendants maintained force was reasonable given resistance and safety concerns; handcuff/struggle justified	Not decided on merits: district court’s credibility-based findings vacated; court remanded for retrial to let jury resolve these factual issues
Whether the district court’s comments and conduct required reassignment to a different judge on remand	Krechman argued the judge’s remarks and reliance on personal experience created an appearance of bias warranting reassignment	Defendants contended remarks did not rise to extraordinary circumstances and judge could be fair on remand	Denied reassignment: although some comments were improper, record did not show inability to be fair; reassignment reserved for rare circumstances
Whether plaintiff’s judicial-bias/due-process claim required relief independent of Rule 50 error	Krechman claimed judge’s courtroom comments and pre-verdict statements created unconstitutional appearance of partiality	Defendants denied bias; argued conduct did not affect substantive rulings enough to require new trial or reassignment	Court did not reach this claim on the merits because reversal for Rule 50 error controlled; concurrence noted comments were worrisome and neared the line for possible relief

Key Cases Cited

Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rule 50 standard for judgment as a matter of law)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on JMOL)
EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party on JMOL)
Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court may not substitute its view of evidence for the jury's on JMOL)
United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1988) (factors for reassignment on remand)
McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (erroneous JMOL grant alone does not require reassignment if judge treated parties evenhandedly)