Carol Rudolph v. Lauren Richard Rosecan
154 So. 3d 381
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Father appointed plenary guardian of his 22‑year‑old autistic son; order incorporated a parenting/timesharing plan.
- Parenting plan gave parents shared responsibility but granted father ultimate authority for major non‑emergency decisions (education, residence, medical); plan did not allocate financial decision authority.
- Father had voluntarily provided the mother annual guardianship accountings for several years; father later moved for an order declaring mother not an “interested person” entitled to inspect reports or object to financial matters.
- Mother claimed the parenting plan and her status as next‑of‑kin made her an “interested person” with standing to receive and challenge financial reports.
- Trial court ruled the mother was not an “interested person” under Florida guardianship statutes for annual accounting or financial matters; mother appealed.
- Fourth District affirmed, holding next‑of‑kin or parenting‑plan rights alone do not automatically create “interested person” status for financial guardianship reports.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mother is an “interested person” entitled to inspect annual guardianship accountings and object | Rudolph: Parenting plan rights and next‑of‑kin status make her an interested person with standing to receive and challenge financial reports | Rosecan: Statutes limit inspection and objection rights to defined parties; mother’s next‑of‑kin or parenting‑plan roles do not create financial interests or standing | Mother is not an interested person for annual accounting/financial matters; no entitlement to inspect or object under these facts |
| Whether next‑of‑kin status alone confers standing to object to guardian’s financial actions | Rudolph: Next‑of‑kin status gives a sufficient interest to object | Rosecan: Next‑of‑kin alone is insufficient absent a concrete financial interest or statutory right | Court: Next‑of‑kin status alone does not confer interested‑person standing |
| Whether courtesy or prior voluntary disclosure creates continuing entitlement to reports | Rudolph: Prior voluntary provision created expectation/entitlement | Rosecan: Voluntary disclosure does not create statutory rights to continued inspection | Court: Voluntary past disclosure does not convert mother into an interested person under the guardianship code |
| Whether parenting plan’s shared decision language includes financial decision or inspection rights | Rudolph: Shared parental responsibility implies involvement in major decisions, including finance‑related information | Rosecan: Plan expressly omitted financial decision allocation; father retained property/financial authority as guardian | Court: Parenting plan did not grant mother rights to financial decision‑making or reports; thus no interested‑person status |
Key Cases Cited
- Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So.2d 498 (Fla. 2006) (definition and limits of “interested person” depend on context; no bright‑line rule)
- Bivins v. Rogers, 147 So.3d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (next‑of‑kin lacked standing to seek change of ward’s residence; nevertheless could be an interested person for certain limited rights)
- In re Guardianship of Trost, 100 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (illustrative guardianship standing issues dependent on facts)
- Bachinger v. Sunbank/South Florida, N.A., 675 So.2d 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (guardianship/standing contexts turn on case‑specific facts)
- Brogdon v. Guardianship of Brogdon, 553 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (standing in guardianship matters evaluated based on whether outcome will affect the person)