Carnell Brown v. Ricardo Rios
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17420
7th Cir.2012Background
- Brown challenged his Armed Career Criminal Act sentence based on prior convictions; main question is whether the Illinois offense of compelling prostitution is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
- The 1983 Illinois conviction for compelling prostitution was described as coercive, involving paying for nonconsensual sex with a third person, raising scrutiny under Begay's framework.
- Illinois history: 1961 pandering by compulsion vs 1977 amendment; the 1977 version punished compulsion and arranging as the same Class 4 felony, with 1–3 year range, affecting how the offense aligns with ACA’s violent felony list.
- A separate 1993 Illinois armed-violence conviction (possession of drugs while armed) was considered for its potential to count as a violent felony under the ACA if it involved sale rather than possession.
- The district court and government conceded a sentencing error under Begay/Davenport retroactivity; the Seventh Circuit proceeded to the merits, reversing and remanding to reduce Brown’s sentence to 10 years.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is compelling prostitution a violent felony under ACA? | Brown argues the harm and risk are akin to violence; compulsion necessarily involves physical injury. | Government contends the offense does not fit the risk profile of listed or catchall violent felonies under Begay. | Not a violent felony under ACA. |
| Does armed-violence conviction for drug possession count as a violent felony under ACA? | Linkage between guns and drugs suggests a risk of violence qualifies as violent under ACA. | Possession alone is insufficient to be a violent felony; sale would be different. | Not a violent felony; only if sale had occurred would it count. |
| Should Brown's sentence be reduced based on Begay and Davenport retroactivity reasoning? | N/A | Goverment concession on retroactive application; proper remedy is adjustment under retroactive standards. | Remand to reduce sentence to 10 years. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (catchall violent felony requires similar risk to listed crimes)
- United States v. Narvaez, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011) (actual innocence concept discussed for habeas relief analogue)
- In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) (three conditions for § 2255-ineffectiveness escape hatch)
- Wyatt v. United States, 672 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2012) (Begay retroactivity and second/ successive motions discussion)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (U.S. 2009) (distinguishes intentional but non-violent offenses from violent felonies)
- United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2012) (applies violence risk to coercive conduct in trafficking context)
- United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (customer-initiated violence risk in prostitution context)
- United States v. Fife, 624 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussion of drug ownership vs. distribution in violent felony analysis)