Carnahan v. Morton Bldgs. Inc.
41 N.E.3d 239
Ohio Ct. App.2015Background
- Carnahan, a Morton Buildings crew foreman, suffered severe head trauma in an ATV accident while working out-of-state and underwent extensive hospitalization and rehabilitation.
- His treating physician cleared him to return to work with a two-week, reduced-hours transition (then full duty), but Morton required a fitness-for-duty exam by its chosen neurosurgeon, Dr. Policheria.
- Policheria’s evaluation—though noting a normal MMSE and many normal findings—imposed work restrictions (no work at heights, avoid falls, avoid head injury, limit exposure to extremes, etc.).
- Morton refused the initial limited-hours return, relied on Policheria’s report, demoted/ultimately terminated Carnahan, citing safety and inability to perform essential duties without accommodation.
- Carnahan sued under Ohio’s disability-discrimination statute (R.C. Chapter 4112), alleging termination based on actual or perceived disability; the trial court granted summary judgment for Morton. The appellate court reversed in part and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Carnahan was actually disabled under R.C. 4112.01(A)(13) ("substantially limits" prong) | Carnahan argued his traumatic brain injury affected major life activities for months and thus qualified as a disability. | Morton relied on medical evidence (including Policheria’s report) showing current normal cognitive and physical function and pointed to company policy re: non-work injuries. | Court: No genuine issue — undisputed evidence showed Carnahan was not presently substantially limited; summary judgment proper on actual-disability claim. |
| Whether Morton regarded Carnahan as having a physical or mental impairment ("regarded as" prong) | Carnahan argued Morton perceived impairment (concerns from co-workers, fitness-for-duty exam, Policheria’s restrictions, internal emails) and fired him for that reason. | Morton argued sending an employee for fitness-for-duty alone does not prove perception of disability and that termination was for legitimate safety reasons. | Court: Genuine issue exists whether Morton perceived Carnahan as impaired and terminated him for that perceived impairment; summary judgment improper on "regarded as" claim. |
| Whether termination was an adverse employment action tied to perceived impairment | Carnahan: Termination followed Policheria’s report and company communications; thus action was motivated by perception of impairment. | Morton: Termination was a nondiscriminatory safety-based business decision. | Court: Termination is an adverse action; factual disputes exist about Morton’s motive, precluding summary judgment. |
| Whether Carnahan could safely and substantially perform essential job functions | Carnahan produced physician clearance and current manual-labor employment without restrictions to show ability to perform. | Morton relied on Policheria’s restrictions and job hazards (working at heights, extremes, frequent climbing) to show inability to perform safely. | Court: Conflicting evidence creates a genuine issue whether Carnahan could safely and substantially perform foreman duties; jury question. |
Key Cases Cited
- Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569 (Ohio 1998) (framework for proving handicap/disability and recognition of "regarded as" theory)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Hood v. Diamond Prods., Inc., 74 Ohio St.3d 298 (Ohio 1996) (application of McDonnell Douglas to disability discrimination under Ohio law)
- Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999) (definition of materially adverse employment action)
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1999) (interpretation of "substantially limits" as requiring present limitation)