Carmichael v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.
155 N.E.3d 386
Ill.2020Background
- In 2010 Mary Terry Carmichael, a Union Pacific employee, was severely injured in a PTI employee-transport van collision; the at-fault driver’s policy paid its $20,000 limit. Carmichael sued and later filed a separate declaratory-judgment action alleging PTI violated 625 ILCS 5/8-101(c) (requiring $250,000 UM/UIM per passenger for certain contract carriers).
- PTI answered, pleaded affirmative defenses asserting that sections 8-101(c) and 8-116 were unconstitutional (special legislation, equal protection, vagueness/due process, commerce clause), and also filed a counterclaim repeating those constitutional challenges and naming the Secretary of State as a counterdefendant.
- The Illinois Attorney General moved to dismiss the counterclaim for procedural defects (failure to follow Supreme Court Rule 19 notice to the AG) and on the merits. The trial court dismissed PTI’s counterclaim with prejudice after addressing the constitutional claims.
- PTI appealed; the appellate court affirmed dismissal but on different grounds: it held the statute did not create an implied private right of action and therefore Carmichael’s complaint should have been dismissed; it avoided the constitutional questions.
- The Illinois Supreme Court held PTI’s counterclaim was not a true counterclaim because it duplicated PTI’s affirmative defenses, failed to allege an independent cause of action or seek affirmative relief against plaintiff, and improperly sought to add the Secretary of State rather than following Rule 19. The Court struck the counterclaim, vacated the trial and appellate judgments, and remanded without deciding the constitutional or private-right-of-action issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PTI’s pleading was a proper counterclaim under 735 ILCS 5/2-608 | PTI’s pleading merely duplicated PTI’s affirmative defenses and did not state an independent cause of action | The pleading was a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutes are unconstitutional and dismissal of Carmichael’s claim | Not a true counterclaim: it duplicated affirmative defenses, requested no independent affirmative relief against plaintiff, and is therefore struck |
| Whether PTI could name the Secretary of State as a counterdefendant instead of using Supreme Court Rule 19 notice to the AG | PTI’s counterclaim named the Secretary of State as a party to obtain a final resolution | PTI argued the Secretary was an appropriate party because he enforces the Vehicle Code | Improper: a counterclaim must be against an existing party; constitutional challenges require Rule 19 notice to the AG rather than naming the officer as a counterdefendant |
| Whether courts should decide the constitutional and private-right-of-action issues on this record | Carmichael maintained the counterclaim was procedurally deficient and should not confer appellate rights | PTI sought resolution on the merits (and later urged the appellate court to decide the private-right question to avoid constitutional adjudication) | Illinois Supreme Court declined to decide those substantive issues now; parties may litigate them at trial on PTI’s affirmative defenses after remand |
| Whether prior trial and appellate rulings resolving the counterclaim and related motions were proper and appealable | Carmichael argued procedural defects made PTI’s attempt to secure appellate review improper | PTI effectively used the counterclaim to obtain appellate review of a nonfinal denial of its motion to dismiss | Court vacated the trial court’s dismissal of the counterclaim and the appellate judgment, noting PTI’s counterclaim improperly conferred appeal rights it otherwise lacked |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307 (Ill. 1949) (defines a counterclaim as an independent cause of action that must stand on its own)
- Rayman v. Peoples Savings Corp., 735 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (duplicative counterclaims that merely mirror affirmative defenses are superfluous and may be disregarded)
- Soderholm, 127 Ill. App. 3d 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (responsive pleading that alleges independent allegations and prays for affirmative relief can constitute a counterclaim)
- Kendle v. Village of Downers Grove, 156 Ill. App. 3d 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (an answer with no specific prayer for relief or substantive cause of action is not a counterclaim)
- Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union Health Service, Inc., 2018 IL 123025 (Ill. 2018) (an order denying a motion to dismiss is nonfinal and not appealable)
- People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510 (Ill. 2001) (supervisory relief is disfavored and reserved for exceptional circumstances)