Carmen Consolino v. Brian Towne, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18950

Carmen Consolino, a Cook County correctional officer and Marine Reservist, sought a two-year FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force assignment; FBI mistakenly sent a request believing the Sheriff preapproved Consolino.
The Sheriff’s Office took no action on the FBI’s letter; Consolino was told the FBI rescinded the request after internal inquiries involving Joseph Ways and Compliance Officer Robert Egan.
Consolino testified at his wife Jennifer Trzos’s Shakman arbitration (alleging political transfer); he later emailed Sheriff Dart and Chief of Staff Towne seeking clarification about the FBI assignment and filed an Office of Professional Review complaint alleging retaliation.
Consolino was reassigned from the Boot Camp to Division XI several months after filing the complaint; he sued Sheriff Dart, Towne, and Egan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Consolino offered only speculation and lacked evidence of defendants’ knowledge or personal involvement in adverse actions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Consolino's testimony at his wife's Shakman arbitration was a motivating factor in denial of the FBI assignment (First Amendment retaliation)	Consolino: His testimony was known to Sheriff’s Office actors and motivated denial; his email and affidavit support inference of defendants' knowledge	Defendants: No evidence Dart or Towne knew of the testimony; Egan merely relayed information and had no role in denial	Held: Reversed? No — Affirmed. Court found only speculation; no evidence defendants knew of testimony or that Egan had personal involvement, so no prima facie retaliation claim proved
Whether transfer from Boot Camp to Division XI was retaliatory for filing a complaint with Office of Professional Review	Consolino: Transfer followed complaint and was retaliatory	Defendants: No evidence any defendant was personally involved; transfer was a lateral reassignment without proof of adverse material impact	Held: Affirmed. Plaintiff produced no evidence of defendants’ personal involvement or that the transfer was materially adverse

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (burden-shifting in retaliation claims)
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (definition of materially adverse employment action in retaliation context)
Yahnke v. Kane County, 823 F.3d 1066 (Seventh Circuit prima facie elements for public-employee First Amendment claim)
Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975 (First Amendment retaliation elements)
Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (protected speech/retaliation framework)
Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989 (need proof defendant knew of protected conduct to show motive)
Harper v. C.R. England, 687 F.3d 297 (speculation insufficient to defeat summary judgment)
Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517 (section 1983 requires personal involvement)
O’Sullivan v. City of Chicago, 396 F.3d 843 (background on Shakman consent decrees)
Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 969 (Shakman decree scope)