Carlwynn Turner v. Burl Cain, Warden
647 F. App'x 357
5th Cir.2016Background
- Turner, an Angola inmate and hobby-crafts vendor, told Rodeo customers that Warden Cain imposed an 18% (cash) / 22% (credit) tax on inmate sales. He later alleged Dupont’s wife overheard and reported this.
- Dupont removed Turner from the Rodeo grounds the same day and told him he could not return; no disciplinary report was issued but Turner was placed on a Rodeo-violation list.
- About 10 days later Warden Cain transferred Turner (and other inmates on the list) to other LDOC facilities; Turner claimed Vannoy told them Cain was displeased and had ordered transfers.
- Turner sued Cain, Dupont, and Vannoy in their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and seeking damages. Official-capacity claims were dismissed; most individual-capacity claims were dismissed pretrial except Cain in his individual capacity.
- The district court later granted summary judgment for Cain, concluding Turner’s remarks were an unprotected prisoner “grievance” made outside grievance procedures; the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dupont/Vannoy were properly dismissed at 12(b)(6) for causing retaliatory transfers | Turner: Dupont and Vannoy participated in or caused retaliatory transfers after his speech | Defendants: Transfers were Cain’s decision; Dupont/Vannoy lacked causation/intent | Affirmed as to Vannoy and Dupont regarding the transfer claim (insufficient allegation that they caused the transfer); reversed as to Dupont for removal from Rodeo grounds (sufficiently alleged retaliatory act) |
| Whether removal from the Rodeo grounds was actionable retaliation | Turner: Removal was an adverse act that chilled speech and deprived him of sales/profits | Defendants: Rodeo participation is a privilege and can be limited | Court: Removal satisfied the adverse-act and objective-chill elements; claim versus Dupont survives dismissal |
| Whether Turner’s Rodeo remarks were unprotected because they were a prisoner "grievance" made outside administrative channels | Turner: Remarks explained pricing to customers, not a prison grievance to officials | Defendants/Ct below: Characterized remarks as grievance and unprotected without use of grievance process | Reversed: Remarks were not a grievance to prison authorities; not per se unprotected; remanded to assess whether restriction was nonetheless justified by legitimate penological interests under Turner v. Safley factors |
| Whether summary judgment for Cain was appropriate on protected-speech/retaliation elements | Turner: Speech to public about taxes was protected; Cain failed to show a penological justification for selectively restricting tax-related remarks | Cain: Participation in Rodeo was a privilege; transfer (not speech restriction) justified and related to status reduction | Reversed: Summary judgment improper. Fifth Circuit remanded for district court to apply Turner balancing (and to appoint counsel). Concurring judge would have resolved protection as a matter of law in Turner’s favor because Cain produced no penological justification and any nonneutral restriction is presumptively invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- Freeman v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2004) (prisoner speech must be consistent with prisoner status to remain protected)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; Turner balancing factors)
- Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (speech rights of inmates retained subject to penological limitations; face-to-face communications often require limitations)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (distinguishes protected public-issue speech from private grievance; relevance to prisoner-speech grievance analysis)
- Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (no constitutional right to incarceration at particular facility, but transfers may still violate rights if retaliatory)
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (government may not prohibit expression merely because it opposes the message)
- Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (content-based restrictions presumptively invalid)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standards; burdens of production)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine issue for trial standard on summary judgment)