Carlton Energy Group, LLC v. Gene E. Phillips, Individually and D/B/A Phillips Oil Interests, LLC, Eurenergy Resources Corporation, Syntek West, Inc., and Cabeltel International Corporation
01-09-00997-CV
Tex. App.Dec 23, 2015Background
- Carlton Energy Group obtained a jury verdict awarding $66.5 million (or alternative $38M "gas‑in‑the‑ground" valuation) against Phillips and related entities; the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the case.
- The Supreme Court rejected Carlton’s gas‑in‑the‑ground valuation as conjectural and concluded nothing in the evidence supported the $66.5M finding, but found some market‑purchase evidence was "some evidence" supporting a verdict.
- The Supreme Court remanded to the First Court of Appeals for further proceedings, noting Phillips may argue the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and that factual‑sufficiency arguments may be raised on remand.
- In response to the remand, Phillips (Movants) filed a motion seeking leave to file supplemental briefing to address the narrowed issues and the Supreme Court’s holdings.
- Phillips argues supplemental briefing is necessary because prior briefs did not anticipate the Supreme Court’s disposition and because the remand raises constitutional questions about whether an appellate court may perform a factual‑sufficiency review when key evidence has been struck.
- Phillips further contends that, absent the jury’s originally credited evidence, any appellate re‑weighing would amount to forbidden fact‑finding and that the proper remedy may be remand for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Carlton's Argument | Phillips' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether supplemental briefing should be permitted on remand | Not directly addressed in this motion; opposed per certificate of conference | Supplemental briefing is necessary to address issues narrowed by the Supreme Court and to respond to its opinion | Supreme Court’s remand contemplates parties may raise factual‑sufficiency arguments; court invited further briefing (motion seeks leave) |
| Whether appellate factual‑sufficiency review may be conducted after the Supreme Court struck key evidence | Jury verdict should stand if some evidence supports it (Carlton relies on prior record) | Appellate factual‑sufficiency review would require the court to reweigh or find facts—potentially beyond its constitutional authority when pivotal evidence has been invalidated | Supreme Court allowed factual‑sufficiency challenge on remand; Phillips urges this court to consider constitutional limits and remand as appropriate |
| Proper disposition given the Supreme Court’s rejection of the gas‑in‑the‑ground theory | Maintain the jury’s damages if market evidence supports it | If jury’s basis for award is eliminated, the appellate court should not substitute its judgment; it should remand for retrial | Supreme Court identified alternative figures as possible but permitted further proceedings; ultimate disposition left to court of appeals |
| Whether prior briefing adequately addresses issues left on remand | Prior briefs suffice | Prior briefing is insufficient because the Supreme Court altered the legal landscape and narrowed issues | Motion argues supplemental briefing is required; court's remand language contemplates reopening argument on factual sufficiency |
Key Cases Cited
- Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1986) (describes appellate court’s role in examining all evidence and remitting for damages only when awards are so against the great weight and preponderance that they are manifestly unjust)
- Barker v. Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2006) (appellate factual‑sufficiency review must not substitute appellate judgment for jury’s credibility determinations)
- ERI Consulting Eng’rs v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010) (appellate court may remand for new trial in its discretion after reviewing sufficiency issues)
- Bunton v. Bentley, 153 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2004) (issues arising from a court of appeals’ judgment may be raised in a motion for rehearing or petition for review)
- Larsen v. FDIC/Manager Fund, 835 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1992) (procedural rule that certain complaints may be raised on petition for review)