Carltez Taylor v. State of Indiana
86 N.E.3d 157
| Ind. | 2017Background
- On the night after Thanksgiving 2015, 17-year-old Carltez Taylor (known as “Looney”) participated in a group encounter where a 9mm handgun was passed around; Taylor loaded the magazine, carried the gun, and later emerged hooded and shot J.W. in the back, who died shortly thereafter.
- After the shooting, Taylor threatened D.G. with the hot gun, helped hide the gun and magazine in a basement, and later taunted or threatened D.G. when they crossed paths in custody.
- Police recovered the hoodie and gun; DNA from the hoodie matched Taylor, and witnesses identified him as the shooter; Taylor ultimately turned himself in.
- The State charged Taylor with murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder, plus firearm sentencing enhancements; two days before trial it amended one alleged overt act in the conspiracy count to allege a co-conspirator supplied the gun.
- At trial the court initially granted an in limine request to bar the nickname “Looney the Shooter,” but a detective later testified to that nickname and the State used it in closing; Taylor did not contemporaneously object.
- A jury convicted Taylor of murder and conspiracy to commit murder (not attempted murder), found the lying-in-wait aggravator and the firearm enhancement, and recommended life without parole (LWOP); the trial court imposed LWOP plus a firearm enhancement, merging other sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use of nickname "Looney the Shooter" — fundamental error | Nickname prejudiced trial; State’s references were improper and warrant reversal despite no contemporaneous objection | Defense argues Taylor may have strategically remained silent; even if improper, references did not cause fundamental error | References violated in limine order and Rule 404, but did not constitute fundamental error given limited use and strong independent evidence of guilt — affirmed |
| Two-day pretrial amendment to conspiracy overt act — untimely | Amendment substantively altered charge (who supplied the gun) and violated the 30‑day rule, prejudicing Taylor | Amendment was formal (which conspirator performed the overt act is immaterial); it did not prejudice Taylor’s substantial rights | Amendment was formal, not substantive; allowed because it did not prejudice Taylor’s notice or opportunity to defend — affirmed |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy to commit murder | Evidence insufficient to infer an agreement to murder rather than mere plan to rough up or humiliate | Circumstantial evidence (threats, luring victim, passing/arming the gun, hiding weapon) supports an agreement and overt act | Enough circumstantial evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt — affirmed |
| Appropriateness of LWOP for juvenile under Rule 7(B) | LWOP inappropriate given Taylor’s youth, background, and the penological aims favoring rehabilitation; request reduction to term of years | State emphasized lying-in-wait, planning, manipulation, lack of remorse, and danger to public; LWOP lawful and supported by jury findings | Exercising App. R. 7(B), the Court revised LWOP to an aggregate 80-year sentence (65 years for murder + 15-year firearm enhancement; concurrent 35-yr conspiracy left intact), citing juvenile differences and comparative precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment bars death penalty for crimes committed under 18)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; juveniles are different in sentencing)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles less deserving of most severe punishments; proportionate sentencing principles)
- Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400 (Ind. 2014) (amending which conspirator performed an overt act is a formal amendment)
- McAbee v. State, 770 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. 2002) (limits on use of nicknames that imply wrongdoing for improper propensity evidence)
- Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 2008) (Appellate Rule 7(B) framework for revising sentences)
- Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 2014) (juvenile sentencing reductions under Rule 7(B); juveniles’ reduced culpability)
- Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012) (upheld LWOP for particularly brutal juvenile murder; contrast for 7(B) analysis)