Carlson v. Lewis County Hospital District No. 1
3:15-cv-05913
W.D. Wash.Feb 7, 2017Background
- Eric Carlson, a gay man, was hired as CFO of Morton General Hospital (part of Lewis County Hospital District No. 1) in November 2014; soon after, a bankruptcy-court opinion referencing possible fraud by Carlson circulated in the community.
- Board members and community members received and discussed the bankruptcy opinion and other complaints; CEO Seth Whitmer held two meetings with Carlson (Dec. 31, 2014 and Jan. 5, 2015) and then terminated him.
- Whitmer later swore in an affidavit that the board pressured him to fire Carlson because Carlson was homosexual and that board members sought a pretext (the bankruptcy opinion) to justify termination.
- All individual board members and Morton HR denied pressuring Whitmer or discussing Carlson’s sexual orientation; they contend the termination was motivated by fraud allegations and community concerns.
- Procedurally, Carlson moved for partial summary judgment (WLAD, equal protection, and due process claims). Defendants opposed, moved under Rule 56(d) to delay consideration of due-process issues until Whitmer’s deposition, and sought an extension of case deadlines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| WLAD discrimination (sexual orientation) | Carlson: undisputed that Whitmer fired him under board pressure because he is gay; summary judgment warranted. | Defendants: factual disputes exist; termination was for fraud/community concerns; board members deny discriminatory motive. | Denied — factual disputes (credibility of Whitmer v. board) preclude summary judgment. |
| Equal Protection (§ 1983 against Hospital District) | Carlson: firing was purposeful discrimination based on sexual orientation; municipal liability follows from board actions/ratification. | Defendants: no showing of discriminatory intent or municipal policy; termination motivated by fraud allegations. | Denied — material fact disputes on discriminatory motive; court need not resolve municipal-policy elements now. |
| Procedural due process (name‑clearing/lack of adequate hearing) | Carlson: entitled to Loudermill/name‑clearing hearing; hearings provided were inadequate. | Defendants: dispute applicability and adequacy of hearings; note handbook invoked by Carlson does not apply to Hospital District. | Denied without prejudice; dispositive resolution deferred pending Whitmer deposition (Rule 56(d) relief granted). |
| Rule 56(d) & scheduling (need for Whitmer deposition) | N/A (Plaintiff sought summary disposition before discovery completed). | Defendants: require Whitmer deposition to oppose/supplement due‑process motion and to address privilege/reconsideration issues. | Granted as to due‑process claims; trial and deadlines extended and dispositive motions may be renoted after deposition. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (nonmoving party must present significant probative evidence)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (genuine dispute of material fact standard)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983)
- Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (§ 1983 framework)
- T.W. Elec. Service Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (summary judgment evidence review)
- Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (conclusory affidavits insufficient)
- Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090 (requirements for Rule 56(d) relief)
- Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962 (modes of proving municipal custom/policy)
- Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (equal protection requires discriminatory intent)