Carlson v. Carlson
299 Neb. 526
| Neb. | 2018Background
- Mark and Karen Carlson divorced in 2008; their PSA was mediated, signed, and incorporated into a consent dissolution decree. Three children were involved; two later reached majority and attended college.
- Decree used standard child-support termination language (support ends at majority, emancipation, marriage, death, or further court order) and expressly incorporated the PSA, making it a court judgment.
- PSA §3.01(4) provided that a child "will not be determined to be emancipated and child support may continue past age 19" if the child attends college or vocational training, with support continuing until age 27 or graduation (subject to enrollment thresholds and limited nonattendance). PSA also addressed educational expense contributions and potential overlap with child support.
- Mark stopped paying support for the oldest child at age 19; Karen sought contempt but withdrew and filed for declaratory judgment that Mark must pay post-majority support while the child is in college. Mark counterclaimed seeking a declaration that post-majority support was unenforceable or discretionary and alternatively sought modification based on changed circumstances.
- Trial court admitted extrinsic evidence, found the decree/PSA ambiguous, ruled Mark was affirmatively obligated to pay post-majority support while the child met the PSA conditions, denied Mark’s modification claim (because he failed to show fraud or gross inequity), and awarded Karen attorney fees. Mark appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Karen) | Defendant's Argument (Mark) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether declaratory relief was appropriate to resolve the parties’ dispute over the decree/PSA | Proper to construe the incorporated judgment via declaratory judgment | Arguably other remedies existed (contempt, modification) but did not bar declaratory relief | Court assumed declaratory relief appropriate; entertained construction of the judgment |
| Whether the decree/PSA is ambiguous about post-majority support | Language requires payment when PSA conditions are met | Language "may continue" is permissive; post-majority support is discretionary | Court held the decree/PSA is ambiguous (two reasonable interpretations) and proceeded to construe it as a judgment |
| Whether "may continue" makes post-majority support permissive/discretionary or creates an affirmative obligation | "May continue" reflects an agreement to extend support when conditions satisfied — not donor discretion | "May" is permissive; Mark can choose whether to pay | Court held the incorporated PSA creates an affirmative obligation to pay post-majority support while conditions (college enrollment, under age 27, etc.) are met |
| Standard for modifying post-majority support in an approved PSA | (Implicit) modification should follow general modification rules or parties’ agreement | Modification should be allowed upon material change in circumstances (statutory child-support standard) | Court held approved PSA post-majority provisions may be modified only as parties agreed or under the general standard for modifying an approved PSA — which requires fraud or gross inequity here; Mark failed to meet that standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Ryder v. Ryder, 290 Neb. 648 (incorporated PSA becomes a judgment; contract principles give way to judgment-construction principles)
- Rice v. Webb, 287 Neb. 712 (meaning of dissolution decree is a question of law; construing from four corners)
- Zetterman v. Zetterman, 245 Neb. 255 (district court may enforce approved PSA provisions providing post-majority child support)
- Neujahr v. Neujahr, 223 Neb. 722 (once decree is final, parties’ subjective intent irrelevant; meaning determined from the decree)
- Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 917 (procedures and remedies for enforcing/modifying decree provisions)