49 Cal.App.5th 135
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2018 the Legislature enacted SB 1421, increasing public access to police records about serious force and misconduct effective Jan 1, 2019.
- Eight police officer associations (POAs) filed a reverse‑PRA writ petition seeking to block agencies from disclosing pre‑2019 records under SB 1421; the agencies largely did not oppose the petition and a temporary stay issued.
- The ACLU and several media organizations moved to intervene (both as of right and permissively); their proposed intervention pleadings sought attorney’s fees under Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5.
- The trial court granted intervention but conditioned leave on the interveners striking their requests for attorney’s fees, reasoning fee claims would enlarge the case; interveners complied and the court denied the POAs’ writ on the merits.
- On appeal the court held the ACLU and media qualified for intervention of right and that the trial court abused its discretion by conditioning intervention on waiving otherwise appropriate § 1021.5 fee claims; the matter was remanded to permit fee motions against the POAs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a trial court condition intervention on a nonparty forfeiting statutory § 1021.5 fees? | Interveners: No, conditioning forfeits a statutory private attorney‑general remedy and is improper. | POAs: Yes; conditioning prevents enlargement and preserves original parties' litigation control. | Court: No; conditioning intervention of right on waiving § 1021.5 fees was an abuse of discretion. |
| Were the ACLU and media entitled to intervene of right under § 387? | Interveners: Yes — they had direct PRA interests and agencies would not adequately represent them. | POAs: No — agencies’ positions aligned with public interest and would represent interveners. | Court: Yes; interveners met criteria for intervention of right. |
| Are interveners in a reverse‑PRA action entitled to § 1021.5 attorney’s fees? | Interveners: Yes — successful public‑interest PRA enforcement fits § 1021.5. | POAs: No or distinguishable — their action was merely clarification, not a classic reverse‑PRA. | Court: Yes; precedent supports awarding § 1021.5 fees to successful interveners in reverse‑PRA suits. |
| Can courts impose reasonable limits on intervenors (permissive vs. right)? | Interveners: Limits may be housekeeping only; less leeway when intervention is of right. | POAs: Court has broad discretion to impose conditions to avoid duplication and enlargement. | Court: Courts may impose reasonable management conditions, but have less leeway with intervenors of right; prohibiting fee claims was unreasonable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal.4th 1206 (2010) (explains private attorney‑general doctrine under § 1021.5)
- Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena, 22 Cal.App.5th 147 (2018) (intervenor in reverse‑PRA entitled to § 1021.5 fees)
- City of Los Angeles v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. Cal., 42 Cal.App.5th 290 (2019) (affirming fee award to requester/intervener in reverse‑PRA context)
- Rutherford v. Owens‑Illinois, 16 Cal.4th 953 (1997) (courts’ inherent powers and limits)
- Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (intervenor‑of‑right less susceptible to participation limits than permissive intervenor)
- Columbus‑America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992) (abuse of discretion where court severely restricted intervener’s participation)
- Lyons v. Chinese Hosp. Assn., 136 Cal.App.4th 1331 (2006) (§ 1021.5 fees ordinarily must be awarded when statutory criteria met)
- Marken v. Santa Monica‑Malibu Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal.App.4th 1250 (2012) (discusses rights of PRA requesters and reverse‑PRA dynamics)