Carlos Poree v. Kandy Collins, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13749

Background

Carlos Poree, adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity for a 1977 shooting, has been civilly committed to Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (ELMHS) since 1999.
From 2002–2011 Poree sought progressively less restrictive placements; in 2010 the ELMHS Forensic Review Panel recommended conditional release to Harmony House with monitoring and conditions.
At the January 18, 2011 hearing multiple treating and state expert psychiatrists and the Harmony House manager testified that Poree was stable, medication-compliant, and appropriate for conditional release to the secure transitional facility.
The state trial judge denied conditional release, stating Poree remains mentally ill and presents a "potential" danger based on the 1977 offense history; state appellate courts denied relief.
Poree filed federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief and this appeal followed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed under AEDPA, concluding the state court decision was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Poree)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1) Is habeas (§2254) the proper vehicle to challenge denial of conditional release?	Habeas is proper because he challenges the fact/location of confinement (transfer denial to Harmony House).	The State contends §2254 is appropriate for challenges to confinement; §1983 usually addresses conditions, but habeas applies here.	Court: Habeas was a proper vehicle for this claim.
2) Did the state court apply a standard "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law by relying on "potential" dangerousness rather than current dangerousness?	Poree: Using “potential” dangerousness strips the Foucha/Jones dangerousness requirement of meaning and conflicts with clearly established law that confinement requires current mental illness and dangerousness.	State: Supreme Court has not clearly defined the temporal scope/quantum of dangerousness; Jones and Foucha require mental illness + dangerousness but do not foreclose consideration of predictive/potential danger.	Court: Not contrary to clearly established law — Jones/Foucha require mental illness and dangerousness, but Supreme Court has not clearly established that a finding labeled "potential" dangerousness is insufficient.
3) Did the state court’s decision involve an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law under §2254(d)(1) or rest on unreasonable factual determinations under §2254(d)(2)?	Poree argued broadly but failed to press a distinct §2254(d)(1) "unreasonable application" or §2254(d)(2) claim on appeal/district court.	State: Any such arguments were inadequately presented/abandoned; AEDPA deferential standard applies.	Court: Poree abandoned the "unreasonable application" argument on appeal and forfeited §2254(d)(2) factual challenge; court did not reach those merits.
4) Did the state court misapply Louisiana law’s dangerousness standard (reasonable expectation of substantial risk)?	Poree: State court’s "potential" finding conflicts with Louisiana’s statutory definition requiring a reasonable expectation of substantial risk.	State: Not decisive for federal habeas absent a showing of conflict with clearly established federal law.	Court: Noted tension with Louisiana law but found relief inappropriate because state court ruling was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent; remedy lies in state courts.

Key Cases Cited

Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (explaining NGBRI acquittee may be confined only while mentally ill and dangerous)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (holding acquittee cannot be continued in confinement absent current mental illness and dangerousness)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (setting civil-commitment proof standard and due process protections)
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (dangerousness and incapacity limits on involuntary confinement)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (AEDPA §2254(d) review standard guidance)