Carlos Enrique Casas v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6744

On Feb. 14, 2015, Officer Seabourn stopped Carlos Enrique Casas after radar indicated the truck was speeding in a 35-mph zone; Seabourn testified speed was 63 mph, Casas said officer told him 43 mph.
Casas was charged with misdemeanor DWI (BAC ≥ 0.15), pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and received a 90-day sentence with imposition suspended and 12 months’ community supervision.
Before pleading, Casas moved to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing lack of reasonable suspicion/probable cause; the trial judge denied the motion after hearing testimony and stated he relied on the admitted evidence and his familiarity with the area.
The community-supervision order assessed $395.10 in court costs; the clerk’s bill showed $100 charged as an "EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SERVICES" cost under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.0185.
On appeal Casas argued (1) the judge’s extrajudicial comments showed bias rendering the suppression denial void, and (2) the $100 emergency-services court cost is facially unconstitutional because it is not directed to a criminal-justice purpose.
The court affirmed the suppression ruling (no impermissible bias) but held article 102.0185’s $100 cost facially unconstitutional and modified the community-supervision order to remove that charge (reducing costs to $295.10).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Casas)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Judicial bias based on judge’s comments at suppression hearing	Judge relied on personal knowledge rather than the record; comments show bias making suppression ruling void	Judge based ruling on testimony in the record; comments did not display disqualifying favoritism or antagonism	Denied: judge’s comments were based on the admitted evidence and did not demonstrate structural bias; suppression denial stands
Facial constitutionality of $100 emergency-services court cost (art. 102.0185)	Cost funds emergency/trauma services not tied to criminal-justice administration; statute is not directed to legitimate criminal-justice purposes and is therefore a tax	Statutory definitions potentially tie expenditures to victims of intoxication offenses, which could be a criminal-justice purpose	Sustained: statute does not direct funds to criminal-justice purposes; cost is facially unconstitutional and was removed from the order

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (structural error and due-process framework)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings usually do not alone establish bias; disqualification requires deep-seated favoritism or antagonism)
Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (judge’s personal knowledge of contested facts requires disqualification)
Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (standard for facial challenge to court-cost statutes; presumption of validity)
Delafuente v. State, 414 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (reasonable-suspicion stop analysis)
Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (no bias where judge heard evidence before commenting)