Carlos Cascos, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of Texas v. Tarrant County Democratic Party Steve Maxwell, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Tarrant County Democratic Party Texas Democratic Party Gilberto Hinojosa, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Texas Democratic Party
14-0470
| Tex. App. | Oct 30, 2015Background
- This is a Motion for Rehearing filed by Texas Democratic Party respondents after the Texas Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision on October 30, 2015.
- Central dispute: whether the Secretary of State abused discretion in denying (or inconsistently allowing) attorney-fee reimbursement requests related to primary-election litigation (the Brimer matter).
- Respondents contend the Secretary promulgated Rule 81.134 (2003) requiring reimbursement where conditions are met, intended to produce uniform application, yet applied it inconsistently across election cycles (2006 vs. 2008) without explanation.
- Respondents argue the Secretary’s unexplained, contradictory decisions effectively permit ad hoc rulemaking and evade administrative-law constraints requiring reasoned, uniform agency action.
- Relief sought: grant rehearing, vacate the Court’s per curiam decision, deny the Secretary’s petition for review, or alternatively affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on fee recovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Secretary abused discretion in denying or inconsistently awarding attorney-fee reimbursements under Rule 81.134 | Rule 81.134 uses "shall," requires reimbursement when conditions are met; Secretary acted inconsistently and without explanation, so he abused discretion | Secretary exercised permissible discretion in evaluating fee requests; his determinations are controlling absent statutory invalidity | Respondents ask Court on rehearing to find abuse of discretion; the Motion argues the per curiam decision wrongly permits unexplained, inconsistent agency action (outcome requested: vacate and affirm court of appeals on fees) |
| Whether the Secretary’s actions amount to improper ad hoc rulemaking | The Secretary’s flip-flop between 2006 and 2008 without changed law or explanation is ad hoc rulemaking and unreasonable under administrative-law principles | Secretary’s interpretive decisions are within agency authority and not subject to reversal absent a showing they are unreasonable or beyond authority | Motion asserts the decisions lacked reasoned explanation and thus failed administrative-law standards |
| Whether Rule 81.134’s promissory language creates enforceable limits on Secretary’s discretion | The rule’s language and promulgation history intended "uniformity" and constrained discretion, so unexplained departures breach the rule | Secretary retains discretion in applying the rule to particular factual claims | Motion contends the Court’s prior ruling nullifies the rule’s mandatory aspects and permits arbitrary outcomes |
| Remedies: whether rehearing should be granted and relief ordered | Rehearing should be granted; Court should vacate its decision and affirm the court of appeals judgment on fee recovery | Secretary seeks to uphold the per curiam decision denying relief | Motion requests rehearing and vacatur or, alternatively, affirmance of the court of appeals on fee recovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. Service Lloyd’s Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. 1999) (court disapproves agency ad hoc rulemaking)
- Texas Coast Utilities Coalition v. RRC, 423 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2014) (deference owed only to reasonable agency interpretations)