Carla Mejia v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
698 F. App'x 540
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Carla Mejia, Henry Martinez, Miguel Martinez) sued Greyhound after their mother developed deep-vein thrombosis (DVT) following bus travel; district court granted summary judgment for Greyhound and plaintiffs appealed.
- Plaintiffs argued Greyhound had a duty to warn passengers about DVT risk and failed to do so, causing the injury (and sought related negligent infliction of emotional distress relief).
- Greyhound argued no duty to warn existed because the risk of DVT from ordinary bus immobility was not sufficiently foreseeable and warnings would not have been shown to prevent the injury.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed California duty principles, emphasizing foreseeability under Rowland and the California Supreme Court’s sliding-scale balancing test for duty (assessing burden of precautions vs. foreseeability of harm).
- The court found plaintiffs presented no evidence that a warning would have prevented the DVT or that sedentary bus travel alone made DVT a reasonably probable harm for passengers; medical evidence showed immobility is a relevant factor mainly when combined with other risk factors.
- Because Greyhound owed no duty to warn, the court affirmed summary judgment and did not reach (or rejected) related negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Greyhound owed a duty to warn passengers of DVT risk | Greyhound knew DVT could occur during prolonged travel and should have warned passengers | Risk was not sufficiently foreseeable for ordinary passengers; warnings would not necessarily prevent DVT | No duty to warn; summary judgment for Greyhound affirmed |
| Whether a warning would have prevented the plaintiffs’ injury (causation) | A warning would have led to precautions that would have prevented DVT | Plaintiffs offered no evidence linking a warning to prevention of DVT in this case | Plaintiffs failed to show warning would have prevented the harm; no causal link established |
| Application of California’s foreseeability/duty balancing (Rowland sliding scale) | Duty arises because DVT risk was known and precautions were minimally burdensome | Foreseeability is low without additional risk factors; burdens and efficacy of warnings do not justify imposing duty | Court applied sliding-scale and found low foreseeability and insufficient preventive effect, so no duty |
| Negligent infliction of emotional distress (secondary claim) | Plaintiffs sought emotional-distress damages tied to the primary injury | Defendant argued no primary liability, so no secondary liability | Court did not reach in depth because no primary duty; secondary claim fails if primary liability absent |
Key Cases Cited
- Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997) (foreseeability is central to scope of duty analysis)
- Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (factors for determining duty of care)
- Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001) (foreseeability plays a very significant role in duty analysis)
- Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610 (Cal. 2007) (articulating California’s sliding-scale balancing test for duty)
- Eriksson v. Nunnink, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (no secondary liability for emotional distress without primary liability)
- Fortman v. Förvaltningsbolaget Insulan AB, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (contemporaneous understanding required for some emotional-distress causation issues)