Carl Smith v. Lisa Doe, 268 So. 3d 457

Carl Smith and Lisa Doe divorced in Feb. 2010; the chancery court incorporated a written property‑settlement agreement into the final divorce decree that allocated substantially greater obligations to Carl (alimony, child support, debt).
The written agreement expressly acknowledged that its terms were more burdensome on Husband and contained clauses stating the parties entered voluntarily, had opportunity for counsel, and that there was no fraud, duress, or coercion.
Carl complied with the agreement’s payments for over two and a half years but in Oct. 2012 filed to set aside or modify the settlement alleging duress, coercion, procedural and substantive unconscionability based on Lisa’s alleged threats (public disclosure of affairs, HIV status, professional consequences) and unequal bargaining power.
The chancellor held a five‑day evidentiary hearing and denied relief as untimely under M.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) and as not filed within a reasonable time under Rule 60(b)(6); alternatively the chancellor found the agreement was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief, concluding Rule 60(b)(1)’s six‑month limitation barred the misconduct claim, Rule 60(b)(6) relief was untimely under a reasonableness/prejudice analysis, and the chancellor’s unconscionability findings were supported by the record. The Court remanded the sealing order for the chancellor to apply the Estate of Cole balancing test.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Smith)	Defendant's Argument (Doe)	Held
Timeliness under Rule 60(b)(1) for misconduct-based relief	Motion challenges settlement as product of Wife’s coercion/overreaching; court should set aside	Rule 60(b)(1) requires motion within 6 months of judgment; Smith waited >2 years	Denied — Rule 60(b)(1) bar applies; motion untimely
Rule 60(b)(6) "reasonable time" catchall relief	Procedural/substantive unconscionability and equitable reasons justify relief despite delay	No good cause for delay; Wife prejudiced by late attempt to reopen finalized settlement	Denied — chancellor reasonably found Smith did not act within a reasonable time and would prejudice Doe
Procedural unconscionability	Smith lacked meaningful choice, was coerced, prevented from consulting counsel, and faced threats	Agreement was clear, front‑and‑center, acknowledged voluntariness and right to counsel; Smith understood and voluntarily entered	Denied — chancellor’s factual findings (voluntariness, understanding, opportunity for counsel) supported
Substantive unconscionability	Terms so one‑sided (custody, extensive financial obligations, debt assignments, long alimony) that no reasonable person would accept	Although disadvantageous, Smith could afford payments, honored them for years; no material change in circumstances shown	Denied — record supports that terms were not so extreme as to be unconscionable and were voluntarily assumed

Finch v. Finch, 137 So.3d 227 (Miss. 2014) (standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions)
Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 451 So.2d 219 (Miss. 1984) (Rule 60(b)(1) addresses relief for misconduct of adverse party)
Burkett v. Burkett, 537 So.2d 443 (Miss. 1989) (abuse‑of‑discretion review requires checking correct legal standard)
Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, 938 So.2d 238 (Miss. 2006) (reasonable‑time inquiry under Rule 60(b)(6) considers prejudice and cause for delay)
M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dep’t of Human Servs., 842 So.2d 527 (Miss. 2003) (Rule 60(b) timing and reasonable‑time principles)
West v. West, 891 So.2d 203 (Miss. 2004) (definition/standard for substantive unconscionability)
Williams v. Williams, 37 So.3d 1171 (Miss. 2010) (policy favoring enforcement of settlement agreements and reluctance to relieve parties from improvident contracts)
Estate of Cole v. Ferrell, 163 So.3d 921 (Miss. 2012) (balancing test for sealing court records)