Carl Lee Jordan v. State of Mississippi
211 So. 3d 713
Miss. Ct. App.2016Background
- On December 10, 2011, Carl Jordan shot David Carter twice during a confrontation after Carter had visited his children; Carter was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to 15 years plus a 5-year firearm enhancement.
- Jordan claimed he acted in self-defense because Carter was armed and had earlier threatened and assaulted Jordan’s fiancée, Tanya (Carter’s ex-wife).
- Jordan proffered Tanya’s testimony about a long history of Carter’s threats, physical abuse, gang affiliation, and prior attempts to harm Tanya—incidents Jordan knew about before the shooting.
- The trial court excluded most of Tanya’s testimony, ruling it was inadmissible character evidence, overly prejudicial, or too remote to be relevant.
- The State did not meaningfully brief the remoteness/character-evidence issue on appeal. The Court of Appeals found exclusion erroneous and concluded the error was not harmless given the conflicting accounts at trial.
- The conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of victim-character evidence to support self-defense | Jordan: Tanya should testify to Carter’s prior threats/violence known to Jordan to show victim’s violent character and Jordan’s state of mind/reasonableness | State: Testimony was undisclosed/tardy and, substantively, too remote, prejudicial, and improper character evidence | Court: Exclusion was erroneous; such evidence can be admissible under Rules 404(a)(2), 405(b) and for state of mind under 404(b); reversal required because error was not harmless |
| Whether specific instances of victim conduct are barred and must be limited to reputation/opinion | Jordan: Specific acts are admissible where victim’s violent character is an essential element of self-defense | State: Trial court treated the proffer as improper specific-act character evidence and excluded it | Court: Rule 405(b) and Mississippi precedent allow specific-instance proof when victim’s violent character is essential to self-defense; exclusion was incorrect |
| Remoteness of prior acts as a basis to exclude evidence | State: Prior incidents were too remote to be relevant | Jordan: Prior incidents were part of continuing course and linked to more recent conduct; relevant to reasonableness and state of mind | Court: Remoteness is a Rule 403 inquiry; linkage to contemporaneous conduct and continuity weigh toward admissibility; court erred in excluding on remoteness grounds |
| Appellate consequence of appellee failing to brief the issue | Jordan: State’s failure to brief amounts to confession of error | State: (did not adequately argue) | Court: Appellee’s failure to brief the issue supports reversal unless affirmance is obvious; here affirmance was not obvious, so reversal warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Myers v. State, 145 So. 3d 1143 (Miss. 2014) (exclusion of evidence is a drastic sanction reserved for deliberate discovery gamesmanship)
- McDonald v. State, 538 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1989) (evidence of victim's violent reputation or threats is competent when defendant claims victim was aggressor)
- Jackson v. State, 784 So. 2d 180 (Miss. 2001) (victim's violent character is an essential element of self-defense; specific instances admissible)
- Newsom v. State, 629 So. 2d 611 (Miss. 1993) (exclusion of victim-character evidence requires reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Richardson v. State, 147 So. 3d 838 (Miss. 2014) (remoteness concerns addressed under Rules 401/403; prior-act showing requirement reconsidered post-Rules)
- Chatman v. State, 761 So. 2d 851 (Miss. 2000) (appellee's failure to brief an issue on appeal is tantamount to confession of error)