Carl Courtright, III v. Barbara Von Blanckensee
20-15473
| 9th Cir. | Feb 22, 2022Background
- Petitioner Carl Courtright, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging a mandatory-life enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) based on a prior Illinois aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction.
- Courtright argued actual innocence of the sentencing enhancement because his prior Illinois conviction was not a categorical match for any federal offenses enumerated in § 3559(e).
- At the time of his direct appeal and initial § 2255 motion, Seventh Circuit precedent treated the Illinois statute as divisible, foreclosing his categorical‑match argument; later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis revised the divisibility analysis.
- The district court concluded that innocence of a sentencing enhancement could not satisfy the § 2255 “escape hatch,” but the Ninth Circuit panel found that conclusion incorrect in light of Allen v. Ives.
- Applying Mathis and Illinois law (including that indictments’ allegations about specific sexual conduct are surplusage), the court held the Illinois statute indivisible and broader than the relevant federal offenses, so the prior conviction was not a categorical match.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded: Courtright may proceed under § 2241 and is entitled to resentencing without the § 3559(e) enhancement; the remand may raise questions about which court should resentence him.
Issues
| Issue | Courtright's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability of § 2241 via § 2255 “escape hatch” | He is actually innocent of the mandatory enhancement and lacked an unobstructed procedural shot to raise that claim earlier | Innocence of a sentencing enhancement is insufficient for the escape hatch; he had procedural opportunities | Escape hatch satisfied: actual innocence claim plus lack of unobstructed procedural shot; § 2241 is available |
| Categorical match/divisibility of Illinois statute | Illinois "sexual conduct" definition lists factual means (touching through clothing, any body part) and is indivisible, thus broader than federal offenses | The state statute is divisible and would categorically match an enumerated federal offense under prior Seventh Circuit law | Illinois statute is indivisible and broader than the federal offenses; prior conviction is not a categorical match; petitioner entitled to resentencing without enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (standard of review for § 2241 denial)
- Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2006) (§ 2255 relief inadequate or ineffective when actual innocence plus lack of unobstructed procedural shot)
- Allen v. Ives, 950 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2020) (actual innocence of mandatory sentencing enhancement cognizable under § 2241)
- Shepherd v. Unknown Party, 5 F.4th 1075 (9th Cir. 2021) (limiting Allen to mandatory sentencing schemes)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (clarifying divisibility: listing alternative means does not make a statute divisible)
- United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (prior Seventh Circuit approach treating certain statutes as divisible)
- Gomez Fernandez v. Barr, 969 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying categorical approach and assessing divisibility using state law indicators)
