Carl Buntion v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director, 982 F.3d 945

Background

In 1990 Carl Buntion shot and killed Houston Police Officer James Irby during a traffic stop; Buntion was convicted of capital murder and initially sentenced to death.
After direct appeals and initial habeas challenges failed, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted state habeas relief in 2009 under Penry and remanded for a new punishment hearing.
At the 2012 resentencing, the jury again found a probability of future dangerousness and recommended death; the trial court reimposed the death sentence.
Buntion filed state habeas (denied in 2017) and a federal habeas petition raising seven claims; the district court denied relief and declined a certificate of appealability (COA).
Buntion sought a COA from the Fifth Circuit on three principal claims: (1) Eighth Amendment challenge to Texas’s future-dangerousness special issue, (2) Due Process challenge based on delay between original and resentencing hearings impairing mitigation evidence, and (3) Eighth Amendment challenge based on time spent on death row.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed procedural-default and exhaustion rulings and denied a COA, finding the claims either procedurally barred or meritless on the merits.

Issues

Issue	Buntion's Argument	Lumpkin's / State's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of jury's future-dangerousness special issue (Eighth/Fourteenth)	Texas statute forces jurors to rely on probabilistic predictions that are unreliable; studies and Buntion’s post-conviction conduct show jury was wrong	Supreme Court precedent permits juror consideration of future dangerousness; the claim was procedurally defaulted for inadequate briefing	COA denied: claim procedurally defaulted; merits rejected based on binding precedent (Barefoot, Jurek)
Due Process: delay between original unconstitutional sentencing and resentencing impaired ability to present mitigation	Long delay between events (and between Penry and state habeas) dissipated mitigating evidence and memory, violating due process	Claim was not raised on direct appeal and is procedurally barred under Texas collateral-review rules; alternatively, no Supreme Court precedent supports Buntion’s novel due process theory and record shows substantial post-1991 mitigation evidence	COA denied: procedurally defaulted and meritless on the merits
Eighth Amendment: execution after long time on death row	Prolonged time on death row renders execution unconstitutional	Claim unexhausted in state court and legally unsupported by Supreme Court precedent; delay is result of pursuing appeals/collateral review	COA denied: unexhausted and meritless
Request for evidentiary hearing on due process claim	Seeks evidentiary hearing to develop extra-record mitigation/delay evidence	An evidentiary hearing depends on making a substantial COA showing on the merits	COA denied; evidentiary-hearing request fails because the underlying claim lacks merit

Key Cases Cited

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (approves jury consideration of future-dangerousness evidence)
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (upholds statutory special-issue scheme requiring jurors to assess future dangerousness)
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (basis for remand due to inadequate vehicle for considering mitigation)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (procedural-default/adequate-and-independent-state-ground doctrine)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (standard for COA when denial rests on procedural default)
Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (addresses remedy for sentences predicated on invalid findings)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits federal review where state-court record is dispositive/exhaustion principles)
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (only Supreme Court can overrule Supreme Court precedent)