Caribbean Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Erikon, LLC, 966 F.3d 35

In 2006 Erikon sold its interest in a Puerto Rico development to CMG; CMG executed a $7.5 million promissory note and Wishinsky personally guaranteed it.
The parties entered a consent judgment in Erikon's favor on March 25, 2008 for $7.5 million plus fees.
CMG/Wishinsky paid $250,000 initially and then, pursuant to a payment agreement, about $2.9 million more through January 2011; collection efforts otherwise were intermittent (writ of attachment, attempted depositions, proposed public sale).
Erikon moved in 2014 to appoint a special master for sale; the district court found the five-year execution period under P.R.R. 51.1 had expired and invited Erikon to seek leave to execute out of time.
Erikon waited until July 2017 to move for leave to execute and to renew the special-master request; the district court denied leave as untimely (more than six years after last payment and over two years after the court’s 2015 warning) and summarily denied reconsideration; Erikon appealed.

Issue	Erikon's Argument	CMG's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to execute beyond P.R.R. 51.1's five-year period	Erikon: it acted diligently to enforce the judgment and delay was excused	CMG: Erikon slept on its rights; delay (6+ years; >2 years after court warning) unjustified	Denied. No abuse of discretion: Erikon's intermittent/indirect efforts did not excuse the prolonged delay
Whether the appellate court may review the underlying denial of leave when the notice of appeal named only the denial of reconsideration	Erikon: intended to appeal both orders; briefing addressed the underlying order	CMG: notice was defective but appellee not prejudiced	Court assumed jurisdiction for purposes of the appeal and reached the merits rather than resolving the notice defect conclusively
Whether Article 1864 (15-year period) or the theory of continuity made execution timely	Erikon: 15-year Civil Code limitations or that current efforts continued earlier timely enforcement	CMG: argument raised too late; merits not preserved	Court did not reach merits: theory was raised for first time on reconsideration and therefore procedurally barred
Whether denial of reconsideration (Rule 59[e]) was an abuse of discretion	Erikon: offered a more detailed diligence account and new legal theory	CMG: no new evidence; merely reargument plus belated theories	Denied. Reconsideration improperly rehashed rejected arguments and introduced new theories too late

Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo, 564 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (treats finality of post-judgment orders and when they are immediately appealable)
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945) (defines finality: ends litigation on the merits)
Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (liberal construction of notices of appeal in context)
Rojas-Velázquez v. Figueroa-Sancha, 676 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2012) (limits of appellate review tied to notice of appeal)
Sobranes Recovery Pool I, LLC v. Todd & Hughes Constr. Corp., 509 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2007) (refusal to permit execution on judgment is a final appealable order)
Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197 (1st Cir. 1987) (admonition that law favors the vigilant, not those who sleep on rights)
Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006) (motions for reconsideration are not vehicles to reargue previously rejected theories)
Mancini v. City of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (new arguments generally may not be raised for the first time on reconsideration)