Career & Technical Assn. v. Auburn Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
2014 Ohio 1572
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- CBA §21.4 provides an “Eighth Period Stipend” of 10% for teachers assigned in lieu of a planning period.
- Prior practice: teachers with eight periods but no planning period received the stipend; those with eight periods plus a planning period did not.
- 2011-2012 schedule changed to start classes at 8:20 a.m., with planning from 7:30 to 8:15 a.m., effectively eliminating the pre-class planning period.
- Board paid the stipend in 2009-2010 and 2010-2011; stopped it in 2011-2012 after schedule change.
- Association filed grievance for breach of the CBA by failing to pay the stipend; trial court granted summary judgment for the Board, which the association appealed.
- Court reverses and remands, finding ambiguity in §21.4 and a need to consider parol evidence regarding past practice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Section 21.4 ambiguous regarding when the planning period must occur? | Association: past practice shows entitlement when teaching all eight periods without a planning period. | Board: planning period must exist/occur to avoid the stipend; section unambiguous. | Ambiguous; fact issue on intent, remand. |
| Does past practice control the meaning of §21.4? | Association: past practice memorialized in CBA governs interpretation. | Board: past practice cannot override clear contract language. | Past practice admissible; creates fact question. |
| Did the 2011-2012 schedule change breach §21.4 by eliminating the stipend? | Association: yes, as past understanding paid stipend when eight periods occurred. | Board: scheduling change and pre-class planning period complied with §21.4. | Issue present; requires factual determination on interpretation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Covington v. Lucia, 151 Ohio App.3d 409 (2003-Ohio-346) (ambiguity; parol evidence)
- Salvato v. Salvato, 2013-Ohio-5268 () (ambiguity; contract interpretation)
- Euclid Asphalt Paving Co. v. Pricom Asphalt Sealcoating, Inc., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-L-175, 2005-Ohio-7049 () (ambiguous terms; use of extrinsic evidence)
- Aultman Hosp. Assn. v. Community Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ohio St.3d 51, 544 N.E.2d 920 (1989) (clear language governs contract interpretation)
- Galatis v. Westfield Ins. Co., 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849 () (contract interpretation; language as controlling)
- Perry v. Million Air, 943 F.2d 616 (6th Cir.1991) (parol evidence to explain terms in contracts)
- United Mercury Mines Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., 259 F.2d 845 (9th Cir.1958) (past practice; parol evidence admissibility)
- American Sugar Refining Co. v. Colvin Atwell & Co., 286 F. 685 (W.D.Pa.1923) (past practice and interpretation of terms)