CARDONA v. VIVINT SOLAR, INC.
2:19-mc-00161
E.D. Pa.Sep 26, 2019Background:
- Plaintiffs Elizabeth Cardona and Jerard Brown sued Vivint Solar, Vivint Solar Developer, LLC, and Solar Mosaic, Inc. in the Middle District of Florida under the FCRA, alleging unauthorized hard-credit inquiries after door-to-door sales solicitations.
- Magistrate Judge Julie S. Sneed limited discovery of prior complaints against Defendants to complaints "from Florida, in 2016 and 2017."
- Plaintiffs issued a third-party subpoena to TransUnion, LLC (to be complied with in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) seeking documents and a deposition on alleged unauthorized accesses and any TransUnion review/investigation (paragraphs 12–14), without any geographic or time limits.
- Defendants moved to quash or modify the subpoena, arguing it circumvents Judge Sneed’s discovery order and seeks information beyond the permitted scope; Plaintiffs argued the material is relevant and that Defendants lack standing to quash.
- The Court considered Rule 45 standing principles and the need to prevent parties from obtaining by subpoena from a nonparty what the court precluded them from obtaining from an adversary.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Defendants have standing to move to quash a subpoena served on a nonparty | Defendants lack standing; only the subpoenaed nonparty may move to quash | Defendants have a personal interest in enforcing Judge Sneed’s discovery order and preventing circumvention by subpoenaing a third party | Defendants have standing to seek modification to prevent circumvention of the prior discovery order |
| Whether the TransUnion subpoena must adhere to the geographic/time limits set by Judge Sneed | Plaintiffs contend broader prior-complaint discovery is relevant and not so limited | Subpoena without limits would evade Judge Sneed’s restriction to Florida complaints in 2016–2017 | Subpoena paragraphs 12–14 (documents and deposition topics) are modified to limit discovery to Florida, in 2016 and 2017 |
| Whether confidentiality concerns require quashing the subpoena | Plaintiffs did not show confidentiality alone bars production; relevance prevails | Defendants argue subpoena seeks sensitive nonparty information warranting quash | Confidentiality concerns do not justify quashing; protective order is the proper remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liquid Nitrogen Proc. Corp. of Cal., 50 F.R.D. 286 (D. Del. 1970) (recognizes exception allowing a party to move to quash when it has a personal right or privilege relating to the subpoenaed subject matter)
- Thomas v. Marina Assocs., 202 F.R.D. 433 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (a violation of a case management or discovery order can confer standing)
- Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (party has a personal interest in enforcing discovery procedures and may seek relief)
- Green v. Cosby, 216 F. Supp. 3d 560 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (mere fact a third-party subpoena seeks information about a party is generally insufficient to confer standing)
- In re O'Keeffe, [citation="646 F. App'x 263"] (3d Cir. 2016) (confidentiality concerns as to third-party records are often addressed by protective order rather than quashing a subpoena)