13 A.3d 823
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2011Background
- Riaso sought confessed-judgment relief in Maryland against Cappels based on their guarantees for Monroe LP’s loan, though the note and guarantees were executed in Virginia.
- Monroe LP defaulted; Riaso filed a Maryland Rule 2-611 complaint in Montgomery County seeking confessed judgment against the Cappels, served in Washington, D.C.
- The Cappels owned Maryland unimproved real property (14500 Friendlywood Road) since 1997; Riaso argued this gave Maryland jurisdiction as a property owner.
- The circuit court held it had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and denied vacation of the order, ruling in favor of jurisdiction under both due process and long-arm standards.
- Maryland law governs the guarantees, but the underlying loan and actions arose outside Maryland, and the Cappels were nonresidents with minimal Maryland contacts.
- The Court of Appeals Vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding no Maryland personal jurisdiction over the Cappels as their Maryland property ownership was unrelated to the action and did not satisfy minimum contacts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Maryland can exercise jurisdiction over Cappels based on Maryland property ownership | Riaso: ownership constitutes transacting business in Maryland | Cappels: ownership unrelated to action; not connection to dispute | No jurisdiction: ownership alone insufficient |
| Whether CJ 6-103(b)(5) supports jurisdiction here | Riaso: statute applies to property interests in Maryland | Cappels: action has no nexus to property | Not a source of jurisdiction for this action |
| Whether the Cappels had minimum contacts with Maryland to satisfy due process | Riaso: property ownership and taxes show contacts | Cappels: no nexus to the note; contacts not purposefully availed | No minimum contacts; due process not satisfied |
| Whether any forum-selection/choice-of-law clauses support Maryland jurisdiction | Riaso: clause could affect jurisdiction | Cappels: not argued or insufficient to confer jurisdiction | Not argued; cannot sustain jurisdiction based on clause |
| Whether the court should consider other fairness factors after minimum contacts | Riaso: factors favor Maryland | Cappels: factors do not arise without minimum contacts | Fairness factors not reached due to lack of minimum contacts |
Key Cases Cited
- Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 330 (Md. 1988) (discusses nexus and categories of jurisdiction; specific vs general; Camelback II cited for contact analysis)
- CSR v. Taylor, 411 Md. 457 (Md. 2009) (merges long-arm and due-process analyses; threshold contacts required)
- Base Metal Trading v. OJSC Novokuznetsky Aluminum, 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002) (minimum contacts required; property presence alone insufficient)
- Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1985) (purposeful availment; two-step analysis including fairness factors)
- Republic v. Mission West, 391 Md. 732 (Md. 2006) (explains general vs specific jurisdiction and minimum contacts)