Capaldi v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia)
152 A.3d 1107
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- Claimant Eugene Capaldi worked as a Philadelphia firefighter from 1969 until retirement in October 2003; diagnosed with squamous cell carcinoma of the right vocal cord in May 2005 and filed a WC claim in December 2012.
- Claimant alleged his cancer resulted from occupational exposure to IARC Group 1 carcinogens (smoke constituents, diesel exhaust) and submitted reports from Drs. Weaver and Singer asserting exposure and causation.
- Employer presented expert proof from Dr. Guidotti (epidemiologist/toxicologist) and Dr. Keane (otolaryngologist) challenging causation and attributing risk to Claimant’s prior smoking and alcohol use.
- The WCJ credited Employer’s experts, discredited Dr. Singer for lacking accepted epidemiological methodology (e.g., Bradford Hill analysis), and found Claimant failed to prove causation under Sections 108(r) or 108(n) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
- The Board affirmed, concluding Claimant could not invoke the rebuttable presumption in Section 301(f) because his petition was filed 476 weeks after last employment (beyond the 300-week window for presumption); this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Capaldi’s Argument | City of Philadelphia’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a firefighter’s cancer is presumptively compensable under Section 108(r)/301(f) without showing the cancer type is caused by Group 1 carcinogens | Section 108(r) and the presumptions should enable relief; Board’s construction is too narrow | Section 108(r) requires the claimant to show the cancer type is one caused by Group 1 agents before presumption applies | Court held Section 108(r) requires proof that the cancer type is caused by Group 1 carcinogens; claimant did not meet this burden, so presumption unavailable |
| Whether Capaldi could use the Section 301(f) presumption despite filing >300 weeks after last exposure (timeliness) | The 300-week limit should not bar application of the presumption; discovery rule should toll the period | Section 301(f) limits the presumption to claims filed within 300 weeks; filing after that only permits ordinary proof without the presumption | Court held the presumption in Section 301(f) applies only to claims filed within 300 weeks; discovery rule discussion was unnecessary because Claimant failed to establish the predicate occupational-disease showing |
| Whether Claimant’s medical evidence established causation under Section 108(n) (catch‑all occupational disease) | Dr. Singer’s opinion that firefighting exposures were a substantial contributing cause of the laryngeal cancer supported causation | Employer’s experts showed methodological flaws in Dr. Singer’s work and attributed cancer to smoking/alcohol; claimant’s proof was inadequate | Court affirmed WCJ’s credibility findings rejecting Dr. Singer and held Claimant failed to prove causation under Section 108(n) or 108(r) |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Philadelphia Fire Dep’t v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sladek), 144 A.3d 1011 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (Section 108(r) requires proof that the specific cancer type is caused by IARC Group 1 agents)
- Hutz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Philadelphia), 147 A.3d 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (presumption in Section 301(f) limited to claims filed within 300 weeks; failure to prove occupational‑disease predicate renders presumption unavailable)
- Lombardo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Topps Co., Inc.), 698 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (WCJ has authority to accept or reject medical testimony)
- Dorsey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Crossing Construction Co.), 893 A.2d 191 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (appellate courts defer to WCJ credibility determinations unless arbitrary or capricious)