33 N.E.3d 1255
Mass. App. Ct.2015Background
- Plaintiffs were inmates previously held in Special Management Units (SMUs) who sued DOC officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging they were entitled to procedural protections when segregated in SMUs similar to those in Departmental Segregation Units (DSUs).
- Their claims paralleled issues decided in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012), where the SJC held that inmates on "awaiting action" administrative segregation are entitled to notice, a hearing, and posthearing written explanation and capped segregation without a hearing at 90 days.
- After LaChance, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice and the DOC began promulgating regulations to implement LaChance and started providing hearings before final regulations issued.
- Plaintiffs argued LaChance did not resolve whether state law or existing DSU regulations (which require a hearing within 15 days) still independently entitle inmates held in DSU-like SMU conditions to DSU protections; they also relied on a 1995 single-justice injunction blocking repeal of DSU rules.
- DOC argued LaChance implicitly governs the due process baseline, that requiring new regulations would be pointless if DSU regs already applied, and that courts cannot judicially restrain an agency from amending regulations except as law requires.
- The Appeals Court concluded the appeal was moot as to the named plaintiffs and exercised discretion not to decide the broader unsettled state-law/regulatory questions now, deferring to the pending DOC regulatory process for concrete review later.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness / Justiciability | Case not moot because it was a putative class action and wrongful practice persists; voluntary cessation by DOC does not moot class claims | Plaintiffs are no longer in SMUs so claims are moot as to named plaintiffs; exception discretionary and prudential | Appeal dismissed as moot; court exercised discretion not to decide merits now given LaChance-triggered regulatory process |
| Scope of LaChance relief | LaChance did not resolve state-law/regulatory question whether DSU regs apply when SMU conditions are DSU-like; plaintiffs entitled to litigate that | LaChance required DOC to promulgate new regulations and implies existing DSU regs do not automatically apply to SMU placements | Court declined to resolve tension now; deferred to administrative rulemaking for concrete facts and later review |
| Applicability of DSU regulations (state law) | DSU regs and Haverty require DSU procedural protections (e.g., 15-day hearing) for placements in DSU-like conditions | DOC contends Haverty does not control SMU "awaiting action" placements and LaChance limited federal due process remedy to a 90-day hearing requirement | Court avoided deciding whether DSU regs still apply; left resolution for after DOC issues and applies new regulations |
| Authority to change regulations / effect of 1995 injunction | Plaintiffs: a 1995 injunction prevents DOC from weakening DSU regs, so DSU protections remain binding | DOC: courts cannot prevent an agency from amending regulations absent statutory/constitutional constraints; LaChance required new rulemaking anyway | Court did not resolve; deferred to administrative process and potential future judicial review |
Key Cases Cited
- LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (SJC 2012) (federal due process requires notice, hearing, posthearing written decision, and no awaiting-action segregation beyond 90 days without a hearing)
- Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 737 (SJC 2002) (interpreting DSU regulations to require DSU procedural protections for placements in DSU-like conditions except very brief confinements)
- Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780 (SJC 1984) (discussing discretionary review of moot cases by the court)
- Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293 (SJC 1975) (class-action context: voluntary cessation does not moot claims affecting the putative class)
- Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319 (SJC 2011) (administrative review is preferable; courts should await concrete factual record after agency action)
- Littles v. Commissioner of Correction, 444 Mass. 871 (SJC 2005) (named plaintiffs' claims become moot when they are no longer confined)