Cannon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 531
5th Cir.2016Background
- Michael Cannon, an experienced mechanical engineer, received a job offer from Jacobs Field Services (JFS) for a field engineer position at a Colorado mining site; JFS rescinded the offer shortly after receiving medical clearance noting his right-shoulder rotator-cuff impairment.
- Cannon cannot raise his right arm above shoulder level and has limited ability to lift, push, or pull with that arm; his doctor cleared him to climb vertical ladders using 3-point contact and recommended accommodations: no driving company vehicles, no lifting/pushing/pulling over ten pounds, and no working with hands above shoulder level.
- Cannon reported prior use of the opioid Ultram (tramadol) but said he had stopped; he passed a pre-employment drug test and his doctor said he was being weaned from Ultram.
- JFS rescinded the offer within hours after learning of the medical restrictions, citing concerns that Cannon could not meet project needs (driving, climbing, lifting, walking on rough terrain). JFS did not meaningfully follow up after receiving Cannon’s doctor’s notes and a video of Cannon climbing a ladder.
- Cannon filed an EEOC charge; EEOC found discrimination (failure to engage in interactive process, undue hardship not shown, no direct threat shown), issued a right-to-sue, and Cannon sued under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment for JFS, finding Cannon not disabled and not a qualified individual. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cannon has a "disability" under the ADA post-ADAAA | Cannon’s shoulder limits major life activities (lifting/reaching) and thus is a disability; alternatively, JFS regarded him as impaired | JFS argued limitations were not substantial for major life activities and that climbing is not a major-life activity | Court: Under the ADA Amendments Act and EEOC rules, evidence supports that Cannon is disabled or was regarded as disabled (broader post-2008 standard) |
| Whether JFS “regarded as” disabled | Cannon: JFS perceived impairment based on medical report and internal emails | JFS: any perception did not amount to regarding him as substantially limited | Held: Evidence (emails, medical report) supports that JFS perceived an impairment; "regarded as" claim viable under amended standard |
| Whether Cannon was a qualified individual as to driving (essential function) | Cannon: could avoid or stop Ultram use and passed drug test; doctor said being weaned; driving may be performable | JFS: driving essential given site; Ultram use would bar vehicle operation and violate mine safety rules | Held: Genuine issue of material fact exists whether Cannon could perform driving (disputed drug use and compliance), so summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether Cannon was a qualified individual as to ladder-climbing / failure to accommodate | Cannon: doctor cleared him to climb with 3-point contact and submitted video demonstrating ability; JFS failed to engage in interactive process | JFS: video showed violation of doctor’s restriction; ladder-climbing is essential and his injury prevents it | Held: Evidence supports that Cannon might perform ladder-climbing with accommodation; JFS rescinded too quickly without adequate inquiry—issue for jury; failure-to-accommodate claim not resolved for summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688 (5th Cir.) (McDonnell Douglas framework and qualified-individual standard in ADA cases)
- Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP v. EEOC, 570 F.3d 606 (5th Cir.) (McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting discussion)
- Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242 (5th Cir.) (effect of ADA Amendments Act in broadening disability definition)
- Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222 (5th Cir.) (interpretation of "regarded as" standard post-ADAAA)
- Alexander v. Northland Inn, 321 F.3d 723 (8th Cir.) (employer need not permit employee to perform tasks prohibited by his physician)
- Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir.) (definition of essential job functions)
- Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., LLC, 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir.) (when employee must request an accommodation; exceptions where disability and needed accommodations are obvious)