Canney v. Strathglass Holdings, LLC, 159 A.3d 330

Background

Strathglass Holdings owned adjacent rental units; Eric Burns rented one unit and provided on-call maintenance/property-management services to Strathglass, including a key and duties like repairs, showing units, collecting rent, and being reachable at home or by phone.
Burns kept a two-year-old pit bull in his fenced backyard. On Sept. 10, 2015, Nicholai (tenant’s 13-year-old son) entered Burns’s private gated backyard to use Burns’s pool and was bitten by Burns’s dog, suffering serious injury.
Burns was at home doing personal work (fixing furniture) when the bite occurred; Nicholai’s presence and purpose were recreational and unrelated to Burns’s work for Strathglass.
Plaintiff (Canney) sued Burns and Strathglass asserting respondeat superior and direct negligence claims; summary judgment was entered for Strathglass after the parties’ facts were undisputed. A default judgment against Burns was later entered for damages.
The trial court concluded (as a matter of law) Burns was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of the bite and that Strathglass had no direct liability; the court granted summary judgment for Strathglass and this appeal followed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Burns was acting within scope of employment when dog bit Nicholai	Burns was on-call and performing landlord-related duties from home; scope should be a factual issue for the jury	Being on-call at home and renting the unit do not, by themselves, make Burns’ private acts within scope; no evidence he was performing assigned work or under employer control at the time	Court held as a matter of law Burns was not acting within scope: child was on private property for recreational purpose and Burns was doing personal work
Whether Strathglass is vicariously liable (respondeat superior) for Burns’s actions	Strathglass is vicariously liable because Burns was its agent/employee performing duties for Strathglass	Because Burns’s conduct and the child’s presence were unrelated to employment, respondeat superior does not apply	Affirmed: no vicarious liability because acts were outside scope of employment
Whether Strathglass is directly negligent as premises owner	Strathglass, as property owner/manager, had a duty to tenants/visitors and could be directly negligent for hazards proximately causing injury	Plaintiff failed to plead or present evidence of any independent negligent acts or breaches by Strathglass (pleading alleged only vicarious liability)	Court granted summary judgment: plaintiff failed to make a prima facie direct negligence claim against Strathglass
Whether summary judgment was proper on undisputed facts	Plaintiff argued scope is often a fact question and summary judgment was premature	Defendant argued all material facts were undisputed and law supported judgment as a matter of law	Court found no genuine issue of material fact and affirmed summary judgment

Key Cases Cited

Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 116 A.3d 466 (Me. 2015) (standard for summary judgment review)
R. I. Mitchell, Inc. v. Belgrade Shoe Co., 125 A.2d 80 (Me. 1956) (scope-of-employment may be question of law or fact depending on record)
Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996) (being on-call alone does not place employees’ acts within scope of employment)
Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286 (Me. 2009) (adopting Restatement (Third) test for scope of employment)
Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 922 A.2d 484 (Me. 2007) (public access to private home for official business can make household maintenance an employment act)
Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 773 A.2d 1045 (Me. 2001) (elements required to state a prima facie negligence claim)
Westberry v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 492 A.2d 888 (Me. 1985) (employee on-call status is insufficient without more to show course of employment)