CANFIELD SCIENTIFIC, INC. v. DR. RHETT DRUGGE
2:16-cv-04636
| D.N.J. | May 25, 2017Background
- Melanoscan owns U.S. Patent No. 7,359,748 (the '748 Patent); Dr. Rhett Drugge is the inventor and Melanoscan's founder. Canfield manufactures the Vectra WB360 imaging system and had communications with Memorial Sloan Kettering (MSK) and Princess Alexandria Hospital (PAH).
- On June 18, 2016 Dr. Drugge emailed numerous dermatologists and institutions accusing a scanner (with an attached image) used at MSK of infringing Melanoscan's patent; the email did not name Canfield or the Vectra WB360.
- On July 15, 2016 Melanoscan's attorney sent letters: one to Canfield and one to PAH accusing Canfield of infringement and asking PAH to refrain from further purchases from Canfield.
- Canfield sued seeking (inter alia) declaratory judgment of noninfringement and claims for tortious interference, Lanham Act § 43(a) false advertising/unfair competition, commercial disparagement (trade libel), and common-law unfair competition. Defendants moved to dismiss Counts II–V.
- Court dismissed Count II (tortious interference) and Count IV (commercial disparagement) without prejudice for failure to plead damages and specific lost economic relationships; also dismissed claims based on the July 15 letters. The Court denied dismissal of Counts III and V insofar as they rely on the June 18 email, finding the email plausibly qualifies as commercial speech. Plaintiff given 30 days to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether June 18 email and July 15 letters support Lanham Act and common-law unfair competition claims | June 18 email and July 15 PAH letter falsely accused Canfield's Vectra WB360 of infringement and were intended to harm Canfield's business | July 15 letters are cease-and-desist/notice (not commercial advertising); June 18 email did not identify Canfield or its product, so not commercial speech as to Canfield | June 18 email: plausible commercial speech as pleaded — Counts III and V survive as to June 18 email only. July 15 letters: not commercial advertising — allegations based on them dismissed. |
| Whether Canfield plausibly pleaded tortious interference with existing or prospective contracts (Count II) | Alleged relationships and a purchase order from MSK and that defendants intentionally interfered in bad faith causing lost business | Plaintiffs fail to identify any lost contract, customer, or concrete damages causally linked to defendants' communications | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead specific lost transactions, reasonable probability of prospective contracts, and damages; also insufficient allegation that Drugge knew MSK was using Canfield when he sent the June 18 email. |
| Whether Canfield pleaded commercial disparagement/trade libel (Count IV) with requisite special damages | Alleged loss of goodwill and lost or prospective sales with MSK and PAH and other recipients of email | Must plead pecuniary harm with particularity (specific lost customers or general diminution with extrinsic facts); conclusory statements insufficient | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead special damages with particularity. |
| Whether Dr. Drugge had requisite knowledge/intent re: Canfield in June 18 email | Canfield contends the email referred to Vectra WB360 in use at MSK and shows intent to harm Canfield | Email does not name Canfield or Vectra; content points to MSK (physicians) as the actors; no plausible factual allegation that Drugge knew MSK was using Canfield when he sent email | Court: Canfield failed to plausibly plead Drugge knew the scanner was Canfield's based on the email alone; need more facts in amended complaint to show knowledge/intent re: Drugge. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim for relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (courts need not accept legal conclusions; plausibility standard explained)
- Avaya Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2016) (elements of tortious interference under New Jersey law summarized)
- Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock-Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 768 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2014) (documents outside complaint may be considered when central and referenced)
- Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) (pleading standard requires facts supporting a reasonable expectation discovery will uncover proof)
- Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers v. American Institute of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (four-part test for whether speech is commercial advertising/promotion under Lanham Act)
- Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (court must accept factual allegations as true and draw inferences for plaintiff)
- Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007) (courts need not accept unwarranted inferences or legal conclusions)
