Candis Flint v. City of Belvidere
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11194
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Marty Flint acted as a confidential informant for Belvidere, Illinois narcotics officers (Officers Dammon and Berry) in 2006–2009, participating in controlled buys and signing cooperation agreements.
- Marty’s informant status became known to defense attorneys in earlier prosecutions; Marty knew his identity had been disclosed before he re-upped with the Belvidere Police in 2009.
- Marty was shot and killed in November 2009; the killer and motive remain unknown and the Rockford police have treated the murder as a cold case.
- Marty’s mother, Candis Flint, sued the City, supervisors, and Officers Dammon and Berry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a substantive due process violation via the state-created danger doctrine (failure to protect an informant who was targeted because of cooperation).
- After discovery closed, Flint moved to reopen discovery and asked the magistrate to appoint a special prosecutor alleging the officers lied in discovery; the magistrate denied both requests and Flint did not timely object to the district judge.
- At summary judgment Flint failed to comply with N.D. Ill. Local Rule 56.1; the district court deemed most defendant factual statements admitted, declined to consider additional facts from Flint’s brief, and granted summary judgment for lack of evidence on causation and conscience-shocking state action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the magistrate abused discretion by denying a discovery extension | Flint: Officers lied in discovery; new inquiry and special prosecutor needed, so discovery should be reopened | Defs: Motion was untimely and speculative; no basis to reopen after discovery closed | Denied — magistrate acted within discretion; Flint forfeited appellate review by not timely objecting |
| Whether a court may appoint a special prosecutor based on alleged discovery misconduct | Flint: Court should appoint a prosecutor to investigate alleged perjury and misconduct | Defs: Appointment is an executive function; no basis in a civil case; not contempt proceedings | Denied — judges may not appoint prosecutors in this context; procedure for contempt/special prosecutor inapplicable |
| Whether defendants’ conduct gives rise to a Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger claim | Flint: Officers’ actions (and alleged disclosures) exposed Marty to danger as an informant, satisfying state-created danger elements | Defs: No evidence linking officers to the disclosure or to Marty’s death; no conscience-shocking culpability; mere possibility is insufficient | Summary judgment for defendants — plaintiff produced no admissible evidence of causation or culpable state action |
| Whether the surviving facts (after Rule 56.1 enforcement) create a triable issue as to causation and mens rea required for substantive due process | Flint: The sequence (informant → disclosure → death) supports inference of causation and culpability | Defs: Temporal sequence alone is speculation; no direct or circumstantial evidence tying defendants to the killing or to a deliberate-indifference state of mind | Held: Temporal coincidence is insufficient; conjecture cannot defeat summary judgment; |
Key Cases Cited
- Windle v. City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation by an individual officer)
- Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014) (no respondeat superior § 1983 liability; municipal liability standards)
- Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2014) (strict enforcement of Local Rule 56.1 at summary judgment)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1989) (Fourteenth Amendment does not impose a general duty to protect individuals from private violence)
- Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2011) (state-created danger doctrine and "shocks the conscience" standard)
- McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2014) (elements of state-created danger; deliberate indifference may suffice in certain circumstances)
- King ex rel. King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2007) (proximate cause/foreseeability element in state-created danger claims)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard: burden shifts and nonmoving party must produce evidence)
- Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2012) (limits on using negligence/gross negligence to satisfy conscience-shocking standard)
- Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2011) (district courts must enforce discovery deadlines; discovery must have an end point)
