Candace Curtis v. Anita Brunsting, 20-20566

In 2012 Curtis (pro se) sued her sisters over administration of the Brunsting Family Living Trust; the district court initially dismissed under the probate exception but this court reversed and remanded.
On remand the district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering accounting and court approval of trust transactions.
In 2013–2014 Curtis (and then her retained counsel) sought to add her brother Carl as a co‑plaintiff; counsel filed an amended complaint and simultaneously moved to remand/consolidate in Texas probate court because joinder would destroy diversity.
In May 2014 the district court granted leave to amend and granted the remand/transfer to Harris County Probate Court; the state court accepted and consolidated the matters.
Curtis later sought relief under Rule 60, alleging fraud on the court by defendants and by her prior counsel (who she asserted sought remand to obstruct litigation and obtain fees), and asked the federal case be reinstated.
The district court denied relief as untimely under Rule 60(b)(6), found no fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3), and concluded it had ceded jurisdiction to the state court; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted to set aside the 2014 amendment/remand orders	Curtis argued the amendment/remand resulted from fraud and counsel misconduct and thus 60(b)(6) relief (or equitable relief) should reinstate the federal case	Remand was permissible and Curtis’s motion invoking 60(b)(6) was untimely and not based on an extraordinary ground separate from other Rule 60 subsections	Denied: 60(b)(6) relief improper because alleged grounds fall within other Rule 60 provisions and Curtis’s motion was not filed within a reasonable time
Whether Rule 60(d)(3) (fraud on the court) relief is available based on prior counsel’s or defendants’ conduct	Curtis contended prior counsel and defendants engaged in an unconscionable scheme to influence the court (fraud on the court) by pursuing amendment/remand	Defendants argued conduct did not rise to the narrow, egregious misconduct the fraud‑on‑the‑court doctrine requires	Denied: Curtis failed to show the kind of bribery, fabrication, or unconscionable scheme needed for fraud on the court; counsel’s actions did not meet the high standard

Wilson v. Johns‑Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rule 60 standard of abuse‑of‑discretion review)
Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch‑all distinct from subsections (1)–(5))
Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2005) (60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances)
Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002) (grounds covered by other Rule 60 subsections cannot be recast under 60(b)(6))
Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (fraud on the court requires most egregious misconduct; unconscionable plan or scheme)
Curtis v. Brunsting, 704 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) (earlier panel reversed initial probate‑exception dismissal and remanded)